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ARTICLES
Improving Water Quality
Antidegradation Policies
Sandra Zellmer and Robert L. Glicksman*
The visual images that helped spur the enactment ofthe nation's foundational environmental laws duringthe 1970s, including the Clean Water Act ("CWA"),
were largely of contaminated resources, such as burning riv-
ers and oil-soaked seagulls.2 Similarly, evocative prose, such
as Rachel Carson's description of the "strange blight"3 afflict-
ing America in the 1960s as a result of the use of chemi-
cal pesticides, played a critical role in alerting policymakers
and the public to the need for new legal protections for
public health and the environment. Over the years, similar
depictions of the environmental devastation resulting from
unconstrained economic activity have continued to play an
important role in creating the momentum for the adoption
of new or strengthened environmental laws.'
* Sandra Zellmer is the Robert B. Daugherty Professor at the
University of Nebraska College of Law. Robert L. Glicksman is the
JB. & Maurice C Shapiro Professor of Environmental Law, at The
George Washington University Law School.
Authors' note: Professor Zellmer thanks research assistants Emily
Rose and Samantha Staley, as well as Erik Schlenker-Goodrich of
the Western Environmental Law Center for his insights on protected
areas. Professor Glicksman thanks research assistants Melissa Dolin
and Erin Dykstra.
1. Clean WaterAct ofl972 ("CWA"), Pub. L. No. 92-500,86 Stat. 816 (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2006)).
2. See RIcHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENvIRONMENTAL LAW 59 (2004)
(describing "visually unsettling events" such as the smoldering Cuyahoga River
and "seagulls suffocated in oil as a result of the Santa Barbara oil spill).
3. RACHEL CARSON, SuLENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin 1994), quotedin ROBERT
L. GucIsSMAN ET AL., ENviRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 18 (6th
ed. 2011).
4. See, e.g., Martha L. Judy & Katherine N. Probst, Superjnd at 30, 11 VT.
J. ENvrL. L. 191, 192-93 (2009) (describing "sites regularly featured on the
television news and in news magazines in the late 1970s and early 1980s [that]
set the stage for passage of Superfund," including the "'Valley of the Drums,'
[which] imprinted on the screen and in the minds of the American public
colorful images of erupting, smoking, seeping, and corroding drums"); Tina
M. Smith, Widilfe Protection and Offihore Drilling: Can There Be a Balance
Between the Two?, 6 FLA. AaM U. L. REv. 349, 366 (2011) (quoting, Prince
Willian's Oily Mess: A Tale of Recovery, NOAA OCEAN SERv. EDUC., http://
oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/stories/oilymess/oily0 linfamous.html) (last
updated Mar. 25, 2008)) ("The images Americans saw on television and the
descriptions they heard over the radio [after the Exxon Valdez oil spill] were
Environmental law, however, has always been about more
than just repairing the damage wrought by past environmen-
tal disasters or mismanagement. Senator Edmund Muskie,
the principal sponsor of the CWA, for example, was moved
to action not only by the environmental despoliation he wit-
nessed, but also by "[t]he beauties of nature . . . in almost
pristine form" at which he marveled while growing up.' The
nation's environmental laws were adopted as much to pre-
serve superior environmental quality as to restore damaged
or degraded resources.'
The CWA reflects this dual conception of the function
of environmental law. Its principal goals are "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of
the nation's surface water bodies.7 The Act's adoption was
spurred largely by the realization that unchecked pollution
had caused the degradation of those waters, making them
unsuitable for uses such as fishing and swimming.' At the
time Congress passed the statute, however, some lakes, rivers,
and streams had water quality that was better than what was
needed to support these uses.' An important question was
whether the statute would limit discharges with the potential
to impair these high-quality waters. The U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's ("EPA") antidegradation policy pro-
vided an affirmative answer.o Yet, the CWAs maintenance
goal has taken a decided backseat to its restoration goal, as
of heavily oiled shorelines, dead and dying wildlife and thousands of workers
mobilized to clean beaches.").
5. Robert E Blomquist, "To Stir Up Public Interest"' Edmund S Muskie and the
US. Senate Special Subcommittees Water Pollution Investigations and Legisla-
tive Activities, 1963-66-A Case Study in Early Congressional Environmental
Policy Development, 22 COLUM. J. ENvrx. L. 1, 6 (1997) (quoting EDMUND S.
MUSKIE, JOURNEYs 79-80 (1972)).
6. See, e.g., The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006) (enunciat-
ing Congress's goal of administering wilderness areas "in such manner as will
leave them unimpaired for the future use and preservation as wilderness, so
as to provide for the protection of these areas [and] the preservation of their
wilderness character").
7. CWA 5 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
8. N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the
Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOwA L. REv. 643,
658 (1977).
9. See id. (showing that state standards previously permitted degradation of high-
quality waters).
10. Id. at 662.
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both the paucity of statutory text on antidegradation issues"
and the emphasis of federal and state implementation on
improving the quality of impaired waters attest.12
This Article focuses on the CWA's relatively neglected
maintenance aspects. It assesses whether the statute's anti-
degradation policy for protecting superior water quality has
fostered the statutory maintenance goal. Part I traces the his-
tory of the antidegradation policy and analyzes the rationales
for precluding the degradation ofhigh-quality environmental
resources. The objectives of, and justifications for, preventing
the deterioration of high-quality resources are best illustrated
by comparing the antidegradation program adopted under
the CWA with the version adopted under the Clean Air Act
("CAN'), which is the most elaborate antidegradation pro-
gram in domestic federal pollution control legislation. Part
II assesses whether the CWAs antidegradation mechanisms
have succeeded in promoting the goals of a well-functioning
environmental quality maintenance program, identifying
several flaws in the CWA program's design and implemen-
tation. Part III compares the CWAs antidegradation policy
to nonimpairment and nondegradation mandates under the
nation's public natural resource management statutes.
Based on this comparative analysis, and the past four
decades of experience with the CWA, Part IV recommends
four reforms to strengthen the CW~s antidegradation pol-
icy. First, we recommend a federal regulation requiring all
states to designate high-quality waters within their borders
for the highest level of protection against degradation of
water quality, including waters within parks and wildlife
refuges. We also support requiring states to take concrete
steps to restore the quality of degraded high quality or excep-
tional waters so that they can support a full suite of beneficial
uses and ecosystem services. Second, the CWs antidegra-
dation program should preclude water quality impairment
that either results in loss or threatened loss of an existing
or potentially viable use-especially fishing, swimming, and
higher uses-or adversely affects the ecological resilience of
the affected water body. Third, we support extending the
scope of antidegradation requirements to cover sources that
are exempt in many states, such as nonpoint sources that
create polluted runoff. Finally, the CWAs antidegradation
program should include mandatory planning and assessment
responsibilities, particularly as applied to the highest quality
waters. These reforms would help fulfill the objectives of an
antidegradation program, move the nation closer to the goal
of ensuring the integrity of our surface waters, and help the
CWA function as more than just a rudimentary pollution
control regime.
1. The History, Structure, and Goals of the
Antidegradation Program
Federal efforts to prevent degradation of water quality pre-
date the adoption of the CWA. Congress endorsed these
efforts in the CWA, although the cryptic manner in which
11. Id. at 673.
12. Id. at 674.
it did left the scope and content of the resulting antidegrada-
tion program unclear."' This Part reviews the history of fed-
eral efforts to prevent degradation of water resources and the
structure of the current regulatory program. It also describes
the goals of federal antidegradation provisions, which are
reflected not only in the CWA, but also in the CA~s preven-
tion of significant deterioration program. Because this Article
measures the success of the CW~s antidegradation program
against the overarching justifications for antidegradation
programs generally, the objectives of the CAAs prevention
of significant deterioration program are just as relevant to an
assessment of the CWA program as are the stated goals of the
CWA itself'4 In short, the parallels between the CAA and
CWA approaches to antidegradation "are absolutely clear.""
A. The History of Federal Antidegradation Programs
in Water Pollution Control
Before EPAs creation in 1970, the Department of the Inte-
rior adopted guidelines to implement the 1965 Water Qual-
ity Act,'6 which required all states to adopt water quality
standards consisting of use designations (such as drinking
or fishing) and water quality characteristics needed to per-
mit those uses to occur." The guidelines provided that "[iln
no case will standards providing for less than existing water
quality be acceptable," and required that standards provide
for "[t]he maintenance and protection of quality and use or
uses of water now of a higher quality or of a quality suitable
for present and potential uses."'" Enforcement of the guide-
lines was cursory, however.'9
In 1968, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall endorsed the
policy of preventing degradation of existing clean water
resources, 20 but retreated from the absolute protection of
13. Clean Water Acrt of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
14. The relevance of the goals of preventing degradation of one enviromnental
medium to efforts to protect a different resource is reflected in the adoption of
the Clean Air Act ("CAA") in 1970. As indicated below at notes 16-24 and
accompanying text, by that time, the Department of the Interior had already
adopted an antidegradation program for water pollution. The Nixon Adminis-
tration advanced the policy rationales that supported Interior's water program
when it supported the adoption of a protection against "backsliding" in the
proposed air pollution legislation. See WILLIAM H. RODGER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw: AIR AND WATER 351 (1986). Cf. OLIvERA. HoucK, THE CLFAN WATER
ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAw, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 192 (1999) (not-
ing that once the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") "thought its
way through the mechanics of meeting [the] statutory goals" of CAA programs
like the prevention of significant deterioration program, the agency had the
opportunity to "ratifr these goals in other statutory contexts, including the
CWA's water quality standards program).
15. Jeffrey Gaba, New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 AiA. L.
REV. 651, 663 n.72 (2004) [hereinafter Gaba, New Growth] (noting the "lack
of detail in the CWA . .. in sharp contrast with" the "well-established require-
ments" of the CAA's prevention of significant deterioration program).
16. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
17. Id. at 908.
18. Hines, supra note 8, at 658 (quoting FED. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AD-
MIN., U.S. DEPT OF INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR EsTABLISHING WATER QUAL-
rrY STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE WATERS 5, 7 (1966)).
19. See Mary A. Stitts, Note, The Ever-ChangingBalance oflower in Interstate Water
Pollution: DoAfected States HaveAnything to SayAferArkansas v. Oklahoma?,
50WasH. & LEE L. REV. 1341, 1356 (1993).
20. Lauren Kalisek, The Principle ofAntidegradation and Its Place in Texas Water
Qualiy Permitting, 41 TEx. ENv. L.J. 1, 5 (2010). See also Jeffrey M. Gaba,
Federal Supervision ofState Water Quakity Standards Under the Clean Water Act,
2
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existing water quality reflected in the 1966 guidelines.21 The
Secretary's policy required maintenance of waters whose
quality was better than established standards unless a state
could justify degradation based on necessary economic or
social development. Still, the policy did not allow degrada-
tion to interfere with current designated uses or uses that
could be made of those waters. 22
Despite the weakening of the 1966 guidelines, state
governors and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce com-
plained that an antidegradation policy would unreasonably
restrict economic development, and state enforcement of
the guidelines continued to lag.23 By the time Congress
adopted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 (now known as the CWA), the water quality
standards of all fifty states nominally included versions of
an antidegradation policy statement. In most states, how-
ever, protection against degradation was little more than an
unimplemented objective. 24
The 1972 law did not expressly include an antidegradation
policy.25 EPA, which took control over federal water quality
programs created in 1972, subsequently argued that such a
policy was "consistent with the spirit, intent, and goals of the
Act," especially the goal of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing]
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."26 EPA refined the policy in 1975, creating
the requirements that, with few changes, remain in place
today.27 In 1987, Congress cryptically addressed antidegra-
dation of water quality for the first time, providing that for
waters whose quality exceeds levels necessary to protect the
designated use, any effluent limitation based on a total maxi-
mum daily load ("TMDL") 28 may be revised only if the revi-
sion "is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation
36 VAND. L. REv. 1167, 1189-90 (1983) [hereinafter Gaba, Federal Supervi-
sion]; Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean
Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79, 104 (2003).
21. 1-ines, supra note 8, at 659.
22. Kalisek, supra note 20, at 5-6. See Water Quality Standards Regulation, 40
Fed. Reg. 55334, 55340 (Nov. 28, 1975) (codified at 40 C.ER. pt. 130).
23. Michael Snyder, Note, Nondegradation of Water Quality: The Needfor Effective
Action, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 890, 893, 897 (1975).
24. Hines, supra note 8, at 659-60.
25. Snyder, supra note 23, at 895.
26. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). See U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON ANTIDEGRADATION 1 (1985) [hereinafter QuEs-
TIONS & ANSWERS], available at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/stan-
dards/upload/2006_12_01_standards..antidegqa.pdf.
27. Antidegradation Policy, 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2011). EPA amended the policy
in 1983. It created a limited exception for temporary or short-term changes in
water quality in Outstanding National Resource Waters ("ONRW"), which
previously had been protected from all degradation. John Harleston, What Is
Antidegradation Policy: Does Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 47 (1996).
EPA made this change because it "was concerned that waters which properly
could have been designated as ONRW were not so designated because of the
flat no degradation provision, and therefore were not being given special pro-
tection." Water Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 51400, 51402
(Nov. 8, 1983) (to be codified at 40 C.ER. pts. 35, 120, 131). See also Robert
L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands II: Water Pollution, 12 UCLA J.
ENvrL. L. & POLY 61, 83 (1993); John L. Horwich, Water Quality Nondegra-
dation in Montana: Is Any Deterioration Too Much?, 14 Pun. LAND L. REv. 145,
158-60 (1993).
28. A total maximum daily load ("TMDL") is the maximum aggregate pollution
loading that the receiving water is capable of assimilating without violating ap-
plicable water quality standards by creating excessive pollutant concentrations
or interfering with designated uses. GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 627.
policy established under this section."29 The statute, which
still governs antidegradation policy, simply incorporates by
reference EPAs prior administrative policy.30
B. The Structure of the Antidegradation Program
An antidegradation policy is a required component of the
water quality standards that states must adopt and enforce. 3'
EPA regulations require the states to include three elements in
their antidegradation policies. 32 First, existing instream uses,
and the level of water quality necessary to protect those uses,
must be maintained and protected-state standards must be
"sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable
waters, preventing their further degradation."3 Second, the
state must maintain water quality that exceeds levels necessary
to support recreation and the propagation of fish and wildlife
unless allowing lower water quality is necessary to accommo-
date important economic or social development. Even then,
water quality standards must fully protect existing uses. 35 In
addition, the state must assure achievement of the highest stat-
utory and regulatory requirements for all point sources 36 and
all cost-effective and reasonable best management practices for
nonpoint sources.37 Third, the state must maintain quality in
high-quality waters that constitute an "outstanding National
resource," including waters of national and state parks and
wildlife refuges and waters of "exceptional recreational or eco-
logical significance."38 In short, the policy requires different
levels of protection for three types, or tiers, of waters.39 Under
29. CWA § 303(d)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2006).
30. Gaba, New Growth, supra note 15, at 672.
31. PUD No. 1 ofJefferson Cuty. v. Wash. Dept of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 718-
19 (1994).
32. 40 C.ER. § 131.12(a). According to one court, the requirement to adopt an
antidegradation policy does not apply to CWA permitting programs adminis-
tered by federal agencies. City of Olmsted Falls v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 435
E3d 632, 637 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding antidegradation policy inapplicable to
federal issuance of dredge and fill permits). The CWA provides, however, that
all federal agencies must comply with state water quality standards, including
a state's antidegradation policy. CWA § 313(a), 33 U.S.C. 8 1323(a) (2006);
Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 E3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cit. 1998).
33. PUDNo. I offeferson Cny., 511 U.S. at 705. See also QUESTIONS &ANSWERS,
supra note 26, at 3 (seating that "no activity is allowable ... which could par-
tially or completely eliminate any existing use").
34. 40 C.ER. § 131.12(a)(2). Aside from an unrealistic no discharge goal, the
CWA's primary goal is to achieve, wherever artainable, "water quality which
provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water ..... CWA 810 1(a)( 2), 33 U.S.C.
5 1251(a)(2) (2006).
35. 40 C.ER. § 131.12(a)(1).
36. A point source is defined under the CWA to include "any discernible, con-
fined and discrete conveyance," such as a pipe. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C.
5 1362(14) (2006). Any source of water pollution that is not a point source is
a nonpoint source, which generates diffuse pollution that creates runoff into
surface water bodies. GLicKsMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 593, 684-85.
37. 40 C.ER. § 131.1 2 (a)(2 ).
38. Id. at § 131.12(a)(3) (2011).
39. EPA has endorsed the adoption by some states of an additional tier, Tier 2.5,
that protects waters to a greater degree than Tier 2 but not as much as Tier 3.
Tier 2.5 waters require "a very high level of water quality protection with-
out precluding unforeseen future economic and social development consid-
erations." Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 E3d 1126, 1127 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (describing Tier 2.5 protection for Lake Michigan) (quoting U.S. EN-
VTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-838-B-12-002, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HAND-
BooKe 8 4.2, at 4-2 (2d ed. 1994), availabe at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/
swguidance/standards/handbook/index.cfm). See also Ohio Valley Enytl. Coal.
v. Horinko, 279 E Supp. 2d 732, 773-74 (S.D. W. V. 2003) (approving in
Winter 20 13
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Tier 1, existing uses must be maintained in all waters.40 Under
Tier 2-high-quality waters that exceed fishable/swimmable
quality-degradation will be allowed only if it is necessary
to accommodate important social or economic development
in the region. 1 Degradation of water quality is completely
prohibited for Tier 3, Outstanding National Resource Waters
("ONRW"),c although "temporary and short-term changes"
in water quality to accommodate important economic uses are
allowed.43 Thus, the policy is designed to protect both existing
uses and existing water quality, but in different circumstances.
The Tier 1 provisions are directed at the protection of existing
uses, while the Tier 2 component aims to protect the quality
of high-quality waters.44 Tier 3 also protects water quality.45
The antidegradation policy affects states administering
the CWA and discharging sources in several ways. States
must review and, if appropriate, revise their water quality
standards at least once every three years.46 Any such revi-
sions must comply with the antidegradation policy.47 If a
state fails to adopt an adequate antidegradation policy, EPA
must adopt one for the state.48 If a state issues a discharge
permit for a point source that violates the antidegradation
policy, then EPA may veto the permit.49 EPA may also reject
TMDLs that violate the policy.o
In addition, the CWA requires those seeking a federal
license or permit for an activity that may result in a discharge
(such as the operation of a hydropower plant or the filling of
wetlands) to provide a certification that the discharge will
comply with state water quality standards.5 Without such
a certification, the federal agency may not issue the license
part and disapproving in part West Virginia's provisions for Tier 2.5). "Because
Tier 2.5 is not required by EPA regulations, the only restriction on [a state's]
Tier 2.5 standards is that they not fall below the minimum standards set for
Tier 2." Id. at 773.
40. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENcy, supra note 39, at 4-1.
41. Id.
42. Kalisek, supra note 20, at 9. See alo Columbus & Franklin Cnty. Metro. Park
Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042, 1055-56 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to equate
degradation of existing water quality with an interference with an existing use
for purposes of application of Ohio's antidegradation rules to high-quality wa-
ters, and rejecting state agency's application of a technological approach that
limited pollutants to a level consistent with water quality criteria for exception-
al waters because "the analysis proceeds from a false premise that the applicable
water quality standard is determined by the use designation rather than the
antidegradation policy.").
43. Water Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. at 51403; U.S. EvTL.
PnT. AGENCY, supra note 39, at 4-10.
44. Gaba, Federal Supervision, supra note 20, at 1,192.
45. U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 39, at 4-1.
46. CWA S 303(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (2006).
47. CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
48. CWA § 303(c)( 4), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4); Raymond Proffitt Found. v. U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 930 E Supp. 2d 1088, 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that
EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to issue a federal antidegradation program
for a state with a deficient program). Cf Miccasukee Tribe of Indians of Fla.
v. U.S. Envl. Prot. Agency 105 E3d 599 (5th Cit. 1997) (holding that dis-
trict court improperly dismissed CWA citizen suit alleging that EPA violated
noundiscretionary duty to determine whether state changes to water quality
standards violated CWA requirements, including the antidegradation policy).
But ef. Nat' Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 E3d 1126, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that EPA did not have nondiscretionary duty to review and evaluate
existing state water quality standards retained after a state's triennial review).
49. CWA F 402(d), 33 U.S.C. F 1342(d) (2006).
50. QUESTIONS & ANSwERs, supra note 26, at 2.
51. CWA§ 401(a), 33 U.S.C. F 1341(a) (2006).
or permit.5 2 Activities covered by this requirement include
discharges requiring a CWA permit in a state in which EPA,
rather than a state, administers the permit program." If a
state's certification for an EPA-issued discharge permit fails
to comply with the antidegradation policy, then EPA may add
more stringent effluent limitations to ensure compliance. 54
C. The Goals ofAntidegradation Pmograms
The reasons to mandate the improvement of inferior quality
natural resources are relatively obvious, and include ensur-
ing that exposure to, or use of, those resources does not
adversely affect public health, destroy critical wildlife or fish
populations, or otherwise disrupt ecosystem functions." By
contrast, no single goal explains legal mandates to prevent
degradation of superior quality resources. Instead, antideg-
radation programs rest on a variety of rationales that tend
to be relevant without regard to the environmental medium
involved, including the desire to provide a margin of safety
to offset the risk that regulations will not provide the desired
level of protection, protect special value natural resources,
prevent the movement of industry to areas with superior
environmental quality, prevent interstate pollution, and pre-
serve opportunities for future economic growth.5' The CWA
and CAA, which contain the best known antidegradation
programs among the pollution control laws, both illustrate
these justifications for preventing degradation of high-
quality resources, and the justifications advanced in support
of both the CWA and CAA programs provide appropriate
yardsticks for evaluating any antidegradation effort. 7
52. Id. See Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 E3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008)
(upholding denial of state certification for natural gas pipeline on ground
that backfill discharge would violate state's antidegradation policy); FPL En-
ergy Maine Hydro LLC v. Dept of Envl. Prot., 926 A.2d 1197 (Me. 2007)
(dam and reservoir facilities not exempt from antidegradation policy); Pub.
Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Dept of Ecology, 51 P.3d 744 (Wash. 2002) (holding
that § 101(g) of the CWA did not preclude state environmental agency from
imposing minimum streaniflow requirements in water quality certification on
holder of state water rights). But cf Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456
E3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The antidegradation policy only refers to water
quality standards and does not refer to water withdrawal."). Federal agencies
may have the power to impose conditions on licensees that are more protective
of water quality than a state certification. See, e.g., Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comn'n, 545 E3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008).
53. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). Most states have received EPA
approval to administer at least portions of the Clean Water Ace's National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System permit program. State Program Status,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last
updated Apr. 14, 2003).
54. QUESTIONS & AawsERs, supra note 26, at 2.
55. CWA § 101 (a)(2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(2) (2006).
56. See, e.g., Craig N. Oren, The Protection of Parkands From Increased Air Pollu-
ton: A Look at CurrenrtPolcy, 13 HARV. ENvTr. L. REv. 313, 315-16 (1989)
[hereinafter Oren, Parklands].
57. Other federal pollution control laws seek to prevent degradation of existing en-
vironmental quality less directly, by incorporating the antidegradation regimes
established under other laws instead of creating independent requirements.
See, e.g., 40 C.ER. F 265.193(g)(2)(iii)(D) (2011) (Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act regulations requiring EPA, in issuing variances from hazard-
ous waste management requirements, to consider the potential adverse effects
of a release on surface water quality, taking into account water quality stan-
dards, including the aneidegradation policy, established for surface waters in
the area of the affected facility). Similarly, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act provides that if any requirement
under a federal law such as the CWA is "legally applicable to" a hazardous
4
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I. Providing a Margin of Safety
The CAA and the CWA both require the adoption of ambi-
ent quality standards to provide a minimally acceptable level
of environmental quality. The CAA requires that EPA adopt
primary standards, which are necessary to protect the pub-
lic health with an adequate margin of safety, and second-
ary standards, which protect the public welfare from known
or anticipated adverse effects associated with air pollution. 8
The CWA requires states to adopt water quality standards
that assure that pollutant concentrations will not exceed lev-
els that will impair designated uses." Both sets of standards
establish maximum permissible concentrations of pollutants
in the air or water, respectively.6 t
Environmental regulation often proceeds in the face of
scientific uncertainty. As a result, regulators may determine
that a particular concentration level is sufficient to achieve
the desired level of protection, only to discover later that
adverse effects occur at lower pollution concentrations than
once believed. Antidegradation rules can protect against
such misjudgments. 61
One ofthe purposes ofthe CAA's Prevention of Significant
Deterioration ("PSD") program is to protect public health
"from any actual or potential adverse effect which in [EPA's]
judgment may reasonably be anticipated to occur from air
pollution ... notwithstanding attainment and maintenance
of all national ambient air quality standards."6 2 Legislators in
1977 were skeptical of regulators' ability to identify harmless
concentrations of air pollution and suspected that the only
way to eliminate health risks would be to set ambient stan-
dards at zero.63 Not willing to go that far, legislative support-
ers of the PSD program sought to minimize risk by keeping
pollutant concentrations lower than required by air quality
standards in areas that already had clean air.64 In this way,
the program would provide a "margin of safety" if pollu-
tion actually caused harm at concentrations lower than any
threshold levels identified by EPA, or if EPA refused, for eco-
nomic or political reasons, to tighten the standards despite
new evidence that existing standards were not sufficiently
substance release or is "relevant and appropriate under the circumstances of
the release," then the remedial action selected by EPA must comply with that
requirement. At a minimum, the action must attain relevant and appropri-
ate water quality criteria found in CWA water quality standards. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(d)(2)(A) (2006). For a case holding that a state groundwater antideg-
radation law was "legally applicable or relevant and appropriate" to a cleanup,
but upholding EPAs implicit waiver of that law, see United States v. Akan Coat-
ings ofAm., Inc., 949 E3d 1409, 1445-49 (6th Cit. 1991).
58. CAA 109(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006).
59. CWA§ 303(c), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(c) (2006).
60. CAA S 109(b), 42 U.S.C. 5 7409(b); CWA 5 304(a)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(a)(2)(B) (2006).
61. CAA § 160(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1) (2006) (emphasis added) (stating that
one purpose of the PSD program is to protect public health "from any actual or
potential adverse effect which in [EPAs] judgment may reasonably be anticipated
to occur from air pollution ... notwithstanding attaimnent and maintenance of
all national ambient air quality standards").
62. Id.
63. See David P Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68
CALIF. L. REv. 48,77 (1980).
64. Id.
protective.65 Accordingly, antidegradation requirements cre-
ate a safety net in the event existing ambient quality stan-
dards are inadequate.66
2. Protecting Special Natural Resources
A second function of antidegradation constraints is to pro-
tect highly valued or vulnerable natural resources that may
be at risk from exposure to pollutant concentrations that
are established to protect public health. Both the CAA and
CWA programs seek to promote that goal.'7
One of the purposes of the CAAs PSD program is to
preserve, protect, and enhance air quality in national parks,
wilderness areas, and other areas of "special" natural, rec-
reational, scenic, or historic value.' Because adverse effects
on natural resources may occur at concentrations lower than
those that trigger health risks, the CAAs welfare-based sec-
ondary standards may be more stringent than the health-
based primary standards." Even then, secondary standards
may not be adequate to protect particularly vulnerable
resources, or EPA may have underestimated how clean the
air needs to be to protect those resources.
During congressional debate, supporters of the PSD
program emphasized the benefits of protecting parks from
air pollution, claiming that preservation of clean air would
prevent damage that would occur even at pollution con-
centrations allowed by the national ambient air quality
standards. 70 Degradation of air quality in national parks
would interfere with scenic vistas in places like the Grand
Canyon and damage unique natural resources, frustrating
the opportunities for preservation, recreation, and spiritual
renewal that justified the creation of national parks and
other protected areas.7 The CWA's antidegradation policy
serves the same function through its prohibition on water
quality degradation in ONRWs.72 Enhanced protections
are particularly critical if resource damage is expected to be
65. See Craig N. Oren, Prevention ofSignificant Deterioration: Csntroi-Compelling
Versus Site-Shifiing, 74 IowA L. REV. 1, 64 (1988) [hereinafter Oren, Con-
trol-Compelling]. Supporters of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
("PSD") program also viewed the program as necessary because the national
standards did not cover certain damaging pollutants such as sulfates that cause
acid rain and failed to account for the synergistic effects of multiple pollutants.
Id. at 60, 82.
66. Richard B. Stewart, The Development ofAdministrative and Quasi-Constitution-
al Law in Judicial Review ofEnvironmental Decisionmaking: Lessorns Fram The
Clean Air Act, 62 IOwA L. REv. 713, 742 n.14 4 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart,
Quasi-Constitutional Law].
67. CAA § 160, 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (2006); CWA § 101(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(c)
(2006).
68. CAA § 160(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2). See generally Oren, Parklands, supra note
56.
69. DAvID WooLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, Appendix
C (2011). In practice, EPA rarely establishes separate secondary standards. See
GLCKSMAN ET As., supra note 3, at 406.
70. Oren, Parklands, supra note 56, at 329.
71. Id. at 315, 346-47.
72. See GncKsMAN ET AI., s7pra note 3, at 616.
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irreversible or to interfere with critical ecosystem functions
or services.73
3. Preventing the Development of Pollution
Havens
Without a nondegradation policy, areas with relatively clean
air or water quality would have a greater capacity to assimi-
late pollution without violating applicable ambient standards
than would more polluted areas.74 Under both the CAA and
CWA, pollution control requirements tend to be most strin-
gent in highly polluted areas that are in violation of ambient
quality standards. The CAA imposes rigorous controls on
pollution sources in nonattainment areas,' and the strin-
gency of the controls tends to increase in relation to the
degree of noncompliance.76 Under the CWA, states whose
waters are more polluted than state water quality standards
allow must establish TMDLs that represent aggregate limi-
tations on discharges into those impaired waters. 7 Absent
nondegradation programs, new industrial sources with
choices about where to locate (putting other factors aside)
would tend to choose areas with less stringent pollution con-
trols to reduce costs of operation.78 The result would be not
only degradation of existing good environmental quality, but
also an exodus of business from industrialized areas to more
remote, cleaner areas.
Antidegradation provisions can prevent "pollution
havens" by removing incentives that would drive industry
to clean areas if they were allowed to deteriorate to mini-
mal levels required by ambient standards. These provisions
address a classic prisoner's dilemma because states with high
air or water quality would bear most of the costs of main-
taining it, while recouping only a small portion of the bene-
fits.79 "Each state, fearing undercutting by a state competing
for economic development, would be reluctant to adopt a
potentially disabling policy absent some assurance about
what other states intended to do. All states would thus be
paralyzed to act."" The CAAs PSD program was designed to
neutralize the attractiveness to industry of areas with supe-
73. See, e.g., ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMrN, & DIANE M. CAMERON,
THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER 200 (1993) (noting that headwater
tributaries of larger watersheds can "provide clean base flow and critical spawn-
ing and rearing habitat to support downstream flows").
74. See Hines, supra note 8, at 643 (discussing a strategy of "reducing pollution
by spreading out discharge sources to take fuller advantage of the assimilative
capacity of existing areas of high ambient air and water quality," but reject-
ing such a strategy because "'[dlilution is not the solution to pollution"'). Cf
Snyder, supra note 23, at 891 ("[A] water pollution control program may be
very effective at pollution abatement in areas of poor water quality, yet if areas
of high water quality become polluted at the same time, the program has only
traded one problem for another.").
75. See, e.g., CAA 5 172(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 7502(c) (2006) (listing requirements for
state implementation plans that cover nonattainment areas).
76. See, e.g., id. § 7511a (2006) (requirements for ozone nonattainment areas).
77. CWA 5 303(d), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d) (2006).
78. See Snyder, supra note 23, at 891-92.
79. Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note 66, at 747.
80. Hines, supra note 8, at 654. See also Stewart, Quasi-Conssitutional Law, supra
note 66, at 747 (noting the usefulness of antidegradation requirements in al-
leviating the "commons' dilemma" by forcing states "to adopt policies which
they would voluntarily select in the absence of transaction costs precluding
common agreement").
rior air quality." The CWA's antidegradation policy serves a
similar function.8 2
4. Preventing Interstate Pollution
The CAA's PSD program also sought to prevent activities
in one state from harming other states by preventing areas
from becoming "'dumping grounds' for the pollution caused
by industrial sources in other regions."83 The argument was
apparently persuasive. One of the goals of the program is "to
assure that emissions from any sources in any State will not
interfere with any portion of the applicable implementation
program to prevent significant deterioration of air quality for
any other State.""
A dispute between Arkansas and Oklahoma illustrates the
potential for the CWA's antidegradation policy to constrain
interstate water pollution. The city of Fayetteville, Arkan-
sas, applied for a permit from EPA that would allow its new
municipal wastewater treatment plant to discharge treated
wastewater into a tributary of the Illinois River about forty
miles upstream from the Arkansas-Oklahoma border."
Oklahoma protested, arguing that the discharge would
impair a portion of the River it had designated as a Tier 3
scenic river." EPA issued the permit anyway, finding that
the discharge would not result in a violation of Oklahoma's
water quality standards." Responding to Oklahoma's chal-
lenge to the permit, the Supreme Court agreed that both the
CWA and EPA's own regulations" authorize EPA to ensure
that a discharge does not violate downstream water quality
standards." The Court, however, affirmed EPA's finding that
the treatment plant's discharge would not cause an actual,
detectable violation of the Oklahoma standards."o Indeed,
the Court concluded that it was not arbitrary for EPA to
base issuance of the permit partly on the benefits to the river
resulting from the increased flow of relatively clean water
from the new plant." The Court's decision endorsed EPA's
view that the CWA bars interstate pollution that causes
81. See Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note 65, at 105, 111 (attributing the
passage of the PSD program in 1977 to an effort by industrialized states to
limit economic growth in the Sunbelt). Distributional considerations may cut
against the adoption of an antidegradation policy; too. According to Richard
Stewart, a nondegradation policy "would inhibit economic development in
areas with considerable poverty and unemployment, while the benefits would
accrue in large measure to the wealthy who can afford to visit scenic areas of
exceptionally high environmental quality or who are more likely to derive psy-
chic satisfaction from their preservation." Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law,
supra note 66, at 750.
82. Cf Bonnie A. Malloy, Testing Cooperative Federalism: Water Quality Standards
Under the Clean Water Act, 6 ENvn.. & ENERGY L. & Por'v J. 63, 86 (2011)
(noting that "lower standards would be more likely to attract industry").
83. Oren, Control-Compelling, supr note 65, at 85.
84. CAA 5 160(4), 42 U.S.C. 5 7470(4) (2006).
85. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 95 (1992).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 97.
88. 40 C.ER. 5 122.4 (2011). This section continues to preclude EPA from issuing
a discharge permit "[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure com-
pliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States."
89. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 105-07. The Court found it unnecessary to decide
whether the CWA requires EPA to protect water quality in a downstream state
from an upstream discharge in another state. Id at 104.
90. Id. at 111-12.
91. Id. at 114.
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guish between Tier I and Tier 2 waters. 112 Likewise, EPAs
definition of Tier 3 (Outstanding National Resource Waters)
is unclear." Moreover, some states' regulations provide no
information whatsoever on how a water body might be nom-
inated or how a designation decision might be made, leaving
protection of the highest quality waters at risk. 14 "Designa-
tion policies in many states are so vague as to be hard for a
concerned citizen or watershed group to use . . . or even to
understand how they could use them."' As a result, courts
tend to defer to the agencies' designation decisions, unless
there is no evidence whatsoever to support them.116
Criteria and processes for distinguishing between Tier 1
and Tier 2 waters are especially opaque. In Kentucky Water-
ways Alliance v. Johnson, the Sixth Circuit addressed a series
of challenges to Kentucky's antidegradation policy."' The
court deferred to EPAs view that its own regulations permit-
ted either a pollutant-by-pollutant or water body-by-water
body approach to determining which waters merit Tier 2
protection." 8 It also allowed automatic exclusion of impaired
waters from Tier 2,n9 and found that a state's program com-
plies with the antidegradation policy as long as all waters
whose quality exceeds fishable/swimmable water quality are
afforded Tier 2 protection.120 According to the court, neither
the CWA nor EPA regulations require that a minimum per-
centage of a state's waters be afforded Tier 2 protection.121
Occasionally, a state's explanation for a designation is so
inadequate that judicial relief is forthcoming. In West Vir-
ginia, for example, a district court invalidated EPAs approval
of the state's antidegradation program for deficiencies in both
designation and implementation.122 With regard to designa-
tion, the court rejected the state's classification of segments
of the Kanawha and Monongahela Rivers as Tier 1 waters.123
The absence of evidence about the water quality of those riv-
ers failed to support denying them the more stringent protec-
tion of Tier 2.124 The court also invalidated EPA's approval
112. 40 C.F.R. § 131.1 2 (a) (2011); Gaba, General Permits, supra note 109, at 454.
See Gaba, New Growth, supra note 15, at 675 ("Unfortunately, the difference
between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters may, in many cases, be more metaphysical
than biological."); Kalisek, supra note 20, at 11 (stating that the states have
struggled with how to identify Tier 2 high-quality waters).
113. 40 C.ER. § 131.12(a)(3). See John A. Chilson, Keeping Clean Waters Clean:
Making the Clean Water Act's Antidegradation Policy Work, 32 U. MiCH. J.L.
REFORM 545, 553-55 (1999).
114. FREY, supra note 111, at 51. See, e.g., Am. Littoral Soc'y v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency 199 . Supp. 2d 217, 238 (D.N.J. 2002) (rejecting challenge to state's
failure to designate any waters to be protected by antidegradation policy be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to identify any waters requiring protection).
115. FREY, supra note 111, at 50.
116. See, e.g., In re Town of Sherburne, 581 A.2d 274, 275 (1990) (upholding
downgrading of waters to accommodate proposed sewage disposal facility).
117. Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 E3d 466, 472-73 (6th Cir. 2008).
118. Id at 475-77.
119. Id. at 477-81.
120. Id. at 4 81.
121.Id
122. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732, 737 (S.D. W. Va.
2003).
123.Id
124. Id. The court ruled that EPA regulations permit classification ofwaters as Tier
1 or Tier 2 based on a water body-by-water body approach, without having to
make classifications for each pollutant. Id. at 747-48. But the record contained
no evidence to justify classifying the rivers as Tier 1, other than their appear-
ance on the list of impaired waters. Id. at 750.
of a provision that failed to require Tier 2 protection in all
cases where the water segment supported minimum fishable!
swimmable uses and had assimilative capacity remaining for
some parameters.125
With respect to the most protective category-Tier 3
ONRWs-some states have no regulations regarding pro-
cesses or criteria for making designation decisions.126 Perhaps
not surprisingly, then, some states have no ONRWs within
their boundaries. 127 EPA regulations include, as examples of
ONRWs, "waters of National and State parks and wildlife
refuges and waters of exceptional recreational or ecological
significance." 28 These waters are not covered, however, unless
a state takes affirmative steps to designate them, and states
sometimes refuse to do so because ONRWs are afforded the
highest level of protection.129 Absent explicit state designa-
tions, courts have refused to recognize ONRWs at the behest
of citizens' groups. 3 '
A few states do in fact use the ONRW designation to
protect wilderness waters and critical habitat, in addition to
parks, refuges, and other unique water bodies.' Montana
automatically designates all "surface waters located wholly
within the boundaries of designated national parks or wil-
derness areas."13 2 Florida's ONRW program includes parks,
refuges, wilderness areas, memorials, and waters of special
recreational or ecological significance.3 3 Colorado includes
water bodies that constitute "a significant attribute" of wil-
derness areas.1 4 Washington has imposed a higher burden
of proving eligibility for Tier 3 status, requiring water bodies
within wilderness areas to be "relatively pristine" or possess
exceptional water quality to be eligible as ONRWs.'35
125. Id. at 766.
126. FREY, supra note 111, at 51.
127. Judith M. Brawer, Antidegrdation Policy and Outstanding National Resource
Waters in the Northern Rocky Mountain States, 20 PuB. LAND & RESouRCEs L.
REv. 13, 21 (1999). See also Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg.
36742, 36786 (July 7, 1998) (characterizing the designation of ONRWs as
limited, although some states have designated a high percentage of their waters
as ONRWs).
128.40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3) (2011). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Thea
Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37
Aniz. L. REv. 701, 716-20 (1995) (describing the implications of ONRW
designation on diversions of water from tributaries to Mono Lake for use in
Los Angeles).
129. BRYAN BIRD & RACHEL KING, WILDEARTH GUARDIANs, CuEAN WATERS, WILD
FORETs: A CiTizEN MANUAL FOR DESIGNATING OUTSTANDING WATERS IN
THE WILD FORESTS OF THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 8 (2011) (states are given
discretion as to the actual designation of ONRWs).
130. See, e.g., Save the lake v. Schregardus, 752 N.E.2d 295, 303 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001) (refusing to treat waters within a state park as automatically entitled to
ONRW status).
131. See C. Mark Hersh, The Clean Water Acs Antidegradation Policy and Its Role
in Watershed Protection in Washington State, 15 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL.
L. & POL Y 217, 222-29 (2009) (advocating use of antidegradation policy as
an underutilized habitat protection tool in Washington state); Brawer, supra
note 127, at 20-27 (discussing designation of ONRWs in Montana, Idaho,
and Wyoming).
132. Mor. ADMIN. R. § 17.30.617(1) (2006).
133. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. § 62-302.700(2) (2006).
134. CoLO. CODE REGs. § 1002-31:31.8(2)(a)(ii)(A) (2007). See also COLO. CODE
REGs. § 1002-31:31.28(C)(3) (explaining that ONRW designations apply in
wilderness areas despite the fact the wilderness areas already have other types
of protections in place; to conclude otherwise "would prevent application of
the outstanding waters designation to waters that may be among those most
deserving of protection").
135. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-330(1)(a) (2003).
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water quality standard violations, including violations of the
antidegradation policy,92 but in practice the burden of link-
ing an upstream discharge with a downstream water quality
violation may be difficult to meet."
5. Balancing Environmental Goals and Economic
Growth Opportunities
Antidegradation programs seek to balance the protec-
tion of existing clean air and water quality and continued
economic growth. 4 A goal of the CAAs PSD program
is to "insure that economic growth will occur in a man-
ner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air
resources."" Under the CWA's policy, degradation of Tier
2 waters is allowed if necessary to accommodate impor-
tant social and economic development. 6 This approach
avoids making existing air or water quality "an absolute
minimum." 7 The result is "a flexible, site-specific consid-
eration of the economic justifications and social need for
water quality degradation in light of available alternatives
and the significance of the predicted degradation."
Antidegradation policies can be a vehicle for promoting
efficient resource allocation. Degradation is allowed if the
value of the economic development that causes it exceeds
the resulting marginal decline in the value of the degraded
resource." Antidegradation advocates have even couched
these programs as job creators, which create opportunities
for new sources by requiring tighter source controls and
lower ambient concentrations in clean areas.'" As some sup-
porters of the CARs PSD program recognized,'O' an anti-
degradation program also may serve as a temporary device
to postpone exploitation of good environmental quality
until the potential for economic growth justifies the result-
ing degradation.'02
92. Id. at 110.
93. For criticism of the standard of proof (i.e., that an upstream source is caus-
ing an actual, detectable violation of another state's water quality standards)
endorsed by the Court, see Robert L. Glicksman, Watching the River Flow: The
Prospecrjor Improved Intersnate Water Pollution Control, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 119, 160-61 (1993).
94. Hines, supra note 8, at 650.
95. CAA § 160(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (2006).
96. Kalisek, supra note 20, at 12.
97. Hines, supra note 8, at 645.
98. Mark C. Van Putten, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 863, 899 (1986). EPAs failure to define important economic and
social development has given states broad discretion to endorse degradation of
Tier 2 waters, as long as existing uses are not prevented or state water quality
standards otherwise violated. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 73, at 202.
99. Hines, supra note 8, at 645.
100. Oren, Control Compelling, supra note 65, at 97.
101. "Representative Waxnasn, for instance, urged that the program ought to be
adopted as a means to control the growth of clean air areas so that there would
be room for future industrial growth; this statement perhaps implies a desire to
use PSD to keep some clean air for later appropriation." Id. at 101.
102. Id. Ihis argument for postponing exploitation "draws from the conservation-
ist, rather than the preservationist, roots of the environmental movement,"
id. at 101-02, in that the former supported the management of natural re-
source use to maximize economic returns over time. See Hines, supra note 8,
at 646 (noting that "the idea of nondegradation seems to be closely related to
large principles of conservation'). These conservation principles are similarly
expressed in the sustained yield provisions of the federal public land masage-
ment statutes described in Part III.A, infra.
II. Historical Experience With the Clean
Water Act's Antidegradation Program
The success of antidegradation programs in preventing dete-
rioration ofhigh-quality water bodies varies widely from state
to state.0 3 Although the antidegradation policy is intended
to protect high-quality waters, it is by no means a precise set
of instructions to the states.104 EPA interprets its role in the
enforcement of antidegradation policies as a passive one.'05
It may disapprove and promulgate all or part of an imple-
mentation process for antidegradation if, in the judgment of
the Administrator, the state's process (or certain provisions
thereof) circumvents the intent and purpose of the federal
antidegradation policy.'06 EPA rarely does so, however.'07
EPA's proclivity for leaving the policy vague, and for afford-
ing broad discretion to the states, has precluded the develop-
ment of a consistent national antidegradation policy.'08 As
a result, critics describe the policy as "at best, obscure," and
lacking in substantive content.'09
This Part reviews the nation's experiences with the des-
ignation of high-quality waters and with the subsequent
implementation of protective measures for, and permitting
decisions in, those waters. It begins by comparing variations
in the states' designation criteria and processes. It then cri-
tiques the states' implementation of permitting authorities
for designated waters, and highlights instances where state
implementation has failed to ensure against the degradation
of high-quality waters. It concludes with an in-depth assess-
ment of the antidegradation policy's deficiencies.
A State Designation Variations
The designation process for Tier 1 through 3 watersi' "var-
ies enormously" from state to state."' EPAs antidegradation
policy does not provide adequate guidance on how to distin-
103. See, e.g., TETIcTECH, INC., EVALUATION OF OPTIoNs FOR ANTIDEGRADATION
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE 20 (2008), availableathttp://dec.alaska.gov/wa-
terlwqsar/wqs/pdfs/Antidegradationtetratechfinal.pdf.
104. Harleston, supranote 27, at, 52-53 ("In its almost thirtyyears of existence, few
details of implementing antidegradation have been expressed.").
105. AvINASH KAR ET AL., NATURAL REs. DEF. COUNCIL, EFFECTiVE EnviRoN-
MENTAL COMPLIANCE AND GovERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE NATURAL
RESOURCEs DEFENSE COUNCIL 9 (2010), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/
international/files/int 10051901a.pdf.
106. U.S. ENvrT. PNOT. AGENCY, supra note 39, at § 4.3.
107. See KAR ET AL., supra note 105, at 7 (noting that EPA could serve as an im-
portant catalyst in defining minimum standards, but that it must work more
closely with the states to ensure compliance with the laws).
108. Harleston, supra note 27, at 77.
109. Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean
Water Act, 31 HARv. ENvr.. L. REv. 409, 454 (2007) [hereinafter Gaba, Gen-
eral Permits]. See also Robert W. Adler, IntegratedApproaches to Water Pollution:
Lessons From the Clean Air Act, 23 HARv. ENvrL. L. REV. 203, 292 (1999)
("the current [CWA antidegradation] program ... is so vague as to defy clear
explanation').
110. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text for a description of the three-
tiered structure of the CWAs antidegradation program.
111. MERRITT FREY, RIVER NETWORK, IMPLEMENTING THE CLEAN WATER ACT
IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST: AN OvERVIEw 45 (2009), available at http://
www.rivernetwork.org/cwwpolicyanalysis. See Adler, supra note 109, at 213
(noting wide variations in designation criteria and processes).
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New Mexico's experience might serve as an example of
how efforts to designate and protect ONRWs can work
fairly well. In 2010, the New Mexico Water Quality Con-
trol Commission adopted an across-the-board rule designat-
ing all perennial surface waters in Forest Service wilderness
areas as ONRWs.3 6 Prior to the rule, there were only two
ONRWs in New Mexico-the Rio Santa Barbara in the
Pecos Wilderness and the waters of the Valle Vidal in the
Carson National Forest.13 7 The new designation covers 700
miles of 195 perennial rivers and streams, 29 lakes, and
1,405 wetlands in 12 wilderness areas." According to the
New Mexico Environment Department, "[t]hese waters rep-
resent the State's most valuable headwater streams. Protec-
tion of these headwaters will help maintain a clean water
supply for uses in Wilderness and for downstream uses by
municipalities, agriculture, and recreational interests, and
will help maintain healthy ecosystems, preserve habitat,
and protect vulnerable and endangered species."'1 9 To pro-
tect ONRWs, the new rule prohibits new or increased point
source discharges that would adversely impact water qual-
ity and requires best management practices ("BMP") for
nonpoint sources. 40 It provides that, except for pre-existing
land-use activities that comply with BMPs, water quality
cannot be degraded in ONRWs.'4'
Ironically, some of the newly designated ONRWs are on
the section 303(d) "impaired waters" list.142 The ONRW des-
ignation may stimulate restoration efforts on these waters.
According to a representative of the Coalition for the Valle
Vidal, the Valle Vidal illustrates how some ONRWs receive
a fair amount of attention for restoration work.' A long his-
tory of grazing, mining, and logging left some of the Valle
Vidal tributaries in a "highly degraded state."" Ongoing
136. Standards for Interstate and Intrastate Surface Waters, N.M. Water Qual-
ity Control Commn, 20.6.4.9.D(3) NMAC (2009); Standards for Inter-
state and Intrastate Surface Waters, N.M. Water Quality Control Comnm'n,
20.6.4.8.A(3)-(4) NMAC (2011); see Press Release, Office of the Sec'y, N.M.
Env't Dept, Water Quality Control Commission Adopts Petition that Protects
Headwater Streams in Wilderness Areas of New Mexico (Dec. 1, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/OOTS/documents/PR ONRWPasses-
Final-12-1- 10.pdf; Standards for Interstate and Intrastate Surface Waters,
N.M. Water Quality Control Cosam'n, 20.6.4.9.B, D NMAC (2011) (pro-
viding criteria for ONRW designation). Two other states in the imtermountain
west Utah and Wyoming have designated all waters within large geograph-
ic areas such as national forests or wilderness areas as ONRWs. FREY, supra note
111, at 50.
137. E-mail from Erik Schlenker-Goodrich, Interim Exec. Dir., W End. Law Ctr.,
to Sandra Zellmer (Jan. 19, 2012) (on file with authors).
138. Order and Statement of Reasons, N.M. Water Quality Control Commn,
WQCC 10-01(R) 23 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at ftp://ftp.nsmenv.state.
nm.us/www/HearingOfficer/ONRW/WQCCOrder+SOR20.6.4NMAC.pdf.
139. Office of the Sec'y, supra note 136, at 2.
140. N.M. WATER QUALITY CONTROL COMM N, ANTIDEGRADATION POLICY IMPLE-
MENTATION PROCEDURE 17 (2010), available at ftp://ftp.nmev.state.nm.us/
www/swqbICPP/2010/CPP-AppendixA.pdf (point sources); N.M. WATER
QUALITY CoNTROL COMMN, GUIDANCE FOR NONPOINT SOURCE DIscHARG-
ES IN OUTSTANDING NATIONAL RESOURCE WATERs G-1 (2009) [hereinafter
GUIDANCE FOR NONPOINT SOURCE DIScHARGEs], available atftp://ftp.nmenv.
state.nm.us/www/swqb/WPS/NPSPlan/2009NPSPlan-AppendixG1 1-30-10.
pdf (nonpoint source discharges).
141. GUIDANCE FOR NONPOINT SOURCE DIscHARGEs, supra note 140, at G-4.
142. E-mail from Schlenker-Goodrich, supra note 137.
143. Id.
144. COMANCHE CREEK, http://www.cosnanchecreek.org/ (last visited Dec. 18,
2012).
restoration efforts include relatively inexpensive, yet effective,
low-tech restoration projects like fencing, erosion control
structures made of rock and vegetation, and road drainage
devices that direct runoff into vegetative buffer zones.'4
Environmental groups applauded the state's efforts to
protect ONRWs,4 6 but the New Mexico Cattle Growers
Association petitioned to set aside the new rule' 7 and urged
the Commission to designate smaller watersheds on a case-
by-case basis rather than in one blanket rule."" The court
ultimately dismissed the Cattlegrowers' challenge on juris-
dictional grounds, leaving the ONRW designation intact,
and the Commission is going forward with the implementa-
tion of the ONRW rule.149
B. State Implementation Variations
EPA regulations require that state water quality standards
"identify the methods for implementing" the antidegrada-
tion policy.i"( In some instances, litigants have leveled facial
attacks on entire state programs or significant components of
those programs; in others, they have identified more discrete
actions, such as the issuance of permits, alleged to be in vio-
lation of the state's antidegradation program.' The judicial
treatment of these challenges has been inconsistent, but one
theme emerges: a state antidegradation program that is little
more than an empty shell is vulnerable to attack.
I. Programmatic Attacks
In Kentucky Waterways Alliance, the Sixth Circuit took issue
with Kentucky's decision to exempt five categories of dis-
charges from the requirement that new or expanded dis-
charges into high-quality waters pass Tier 2 review.152 The
plaintiffs argued that the exemptions "eviscerate[d] Ken-
145. Restoration Practices, COMANCHE CREEK, http://conanchecreek.org/Restora
tionPractices/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2012). Restoration goals are
"to meet current water quality standards; restore hydrologic function to the
creek and it[s] tributaries; and maximize habitat for the Rio Grande cutthroat
trout." COMANCHE CREEIL supra note 144.
146. Press Release, Susan Montoya Bryan, Associated Press, NM Regulators Ap-
prove Outstanding Waters, (Dec. 1 2010), available at ftp://ftp.nnenv.state.
nm.uslwwwswqblNews/AP12-01-201OArticle.pdf. See generally Overview of
ONRW Protections and History in New Mexico, AMIGOs BRAvos, http://ami-
gosbravos.orglonrw.php (last visited Dec. 18, 2012).
147. Brief for Appellant, N.M. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Water Quality Control
Comm'n, Ct. App. No. 31,191 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2011); see Staci
Matlock, New Rule Under Fire From N.M. Cattle Growers Association, SAN-
TA FE NEW MExICAN (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.samtafenewmexican.com/
localnewsloutstanding-waters-New-rule-under-fire-fromu-catle-growers.
148. See Brief for Appellant at 20, N M. Cattle GroersAss'n, Cc App. No. 31,191.
149. See N.M. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. N.M. Water Quality Comm'n, No. 31,191
(N.M. C. App. Dec. 26, 2012). See abo Water Quality Standards. Outstand-
ing National Resource Waters, SURFACE WATER QUALITY BUREAU, N.M. Eay'T
DEPT, http://www.nmenv.state.n.usIswqb/ONRW/ (last updated Dec. 18,
2012).
150. 40 C.ER. 5 131.12(a) (2012).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 152-74 (progransuatic challenges); infra
text accompanying notes 175-203 (challenges to discrete actions).
152. Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 E3d 466, 491 (6th Cir 2008). The
five categories included any expanded discharge under a renewed or modified
state permit, so long as the expansion did not increase pollutau loading by
twenty percent or more. Id,; see aso supra text accompanying notes 117-21
(describing court's deference to EPAs approval of Kentucky's exclusion of cer-
rain waters from Tier 2 designation).
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tucky's Tier [2] review process, allowing significant degrada-
tions in water quality without demonstrated necessity."" The
court reasoned that because EPAs antidegradation regula-
tions protected assimilative capacity, EPAs task was to focus
on how much assimilative capacity would be lost under the
exemptions, and, in particular, whether that loss would be
significant or merely de minimis.5 4 Instead of assessing the
exemptions' cumulative effects, EPA measured Kentucky's
compliance by assessing whether each individual exemption
resulted in "significant" or "insignificant" degradation of
assimilative capacity. 5 The court, therefore, lacked an ade-
quate factual record for determining whether the exemptions
together permitted significant degradation, and it remanded
to EPA for further analysis."'
Similarly, the West Virginia district court chastised
EPA for ignoring the plain meaning of the state regula-
tions in approving provisions allowing new or expanded
discharges from wastewater treatment plants to evade Tier
2 review if the discharge resulted in a net decrease in the
overall pollutant loading.157 According to the court, EPAs
approval in effect rewrote the provision to apply only when
there is a net decrease in the pollutant loading for each
pollutant parameter.5
EPAs lack of vigilance in overseeing state compliance
with the antidegradation policy was also reflected in its
approval of an egregiously deficient implementation plan
in Oregon."' The plan contained only one sentence provid-
ing that the state's entire set of water quality standards was
"intended to implement the Antidegradation Policy."6 o The
court held that EPA erred in approving a policy that failed
to identify "even a semblance of an implementation plan," in
153. Ky Waterways Alliance, 540 E3d at 492.
154. Id. "[A]ssimilative capacity is a measurement of the amount by which. . . qual-
ity exceeds levels necessary to support fish, wildlife, and recreation." Id. at 484.
According to EPA, "the central purpose of the federal Tier II antidegradation
regulations is to protect a water bodys assimilative capacity, which is 'the dif-
ference between the applicable water quality criterion for a pollutant parameter
and the ambient water quality for that parameter when it is better than the
criterion.'" Id. (citing Memorandum from Ephraim S. King, Dir., Office of
Sci. & Tech., U.S. EnvtL Prot. Agency, to Water Mgmt. Div. Dirs. (Aug. 10,
2005)); Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. at 36793.
155. Ky Waterways Alliance, 540 E3d at 492.
156. Id at 492-93. Cf Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 E Supp. 2d 732,
770-73 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (invalidating EPA's approval of a provision deem-
ing degradation to be significant if the proposed activity, together with all other
activities allowed after the baseline water quality is established, resulted in a
reduction of a water segment's available assimilative capacity of twenty per-
cent or more for parameters of concern because EPA failed to explain why a
twenty percent reduction in assimilative capacity should be considered insig-
nificant); Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus, 685 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio C.P.
1997) (holding that state law allowing agency to approve lowering of stream's
water quality by as much as eighty percent of its assimilative capacity without
antidegradation review was inconsistent with the CWA).
157. Ohio Valley Enytl Coal, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 737-38, 752-57. See supra note
124 (describing court's invalidation of Tier 1 designations).
158. Ohio Valley EnvtL CoaL, 279 E Supp. 2d at 737 38, 752 57. The court up-
held EPA's approval of other aspects of the program. It held that EPA properly
approved the state's partial exemption of existing permitted uses from Tier 2
review, a provision allowing for a de minimis ten percent reduction in the
available assimilative capacity of Tier 2 waters before Tier 2 review is required,
and provisions allowing water quality trades without triggering antidegrada-
tion review. Id. at 751-52, 767-70, 774-76.
159. See Nw. Enytl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 268 E Supp. 2d 1255
(D. Or. 2003).
160. Id at 1264-65 (quoting Ot- ADMIN. R. 340-041-0026(1)(a) (2012)).
clear violation of its own regulation.'' Subsequently, when
EPA approved Oregon's revised implementation plan, its
decision was remanded once again because the plan failed
to specify a method to identify and protect existing useS.162
The court rejected EPAs argument that the CWA does not
specify a minimum method for implementing antidegrada-
tion policies but simply requires that states "identify meth-
ods for their implementation."'63 It concluded that EPA must
review the state's entire implementation plan to ensure that
it describes all of the required elements and does not cir-
cumvent the purpose of the antidegradation policy.64 On
the other hand, the court deferred to EPAs determination
that a provision that applied to "recognized beneficial uses"
protected all "existing uses" from becoming "unacceptably
threatened or impaired." 65 It also upheld EPAs interpreta-
tion of Oregon's use of the term "unacceptably" as allow-
ing only de minimis threats or impairments to existing uses,
but noted that "Oregon's program must, at a minimum, not
allow activities that could partially or completely eliminate
any existing uses."'66
Some of the most significant programmatic challenges
have involved nonpoint source pollution. Judicial reactions
to these challenges have been mixed. When Montana's
legislature "attempted to undermine the effectiveness of
the ONRW designation by exempting activities identified
as 'nonsignificant' from antidegradation review," 67 EPA
directed the state to revise its program to protect the water
quality of ONRWs from "even non-significant, permanent
changes in water quality." 6 8 EPA approved Montana's sub-
sequent proposal, which extended the antidegradation pro-
gram to all point sources, but continued to exempt nonpoint
sources (and mixing zones) from its requirements.169 In par-
ticular, Montana's new provision exempted nonpoint sources
from the antidegradation requirements for Tier 2 waters
"when reasonable land, soil, and water conservation prac-
tices [were] applied and existing and anticipated beneficial
uses [would] be fully protected."'70 In American Wildlands v.
Browner, the Tenth Circuit deferred to EPAs approval based
161. Id. at 1265 (citing 40 C.ER. § 131.12(a) (2011)). See also CORAIations v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 477 F. Supp. 2d 413, 418 (D.P.R. 2007) (overturn-
ing EPA's approval of water quality standards that lacked any methods or pro-
cedures to apply Puerto Rico's antidegradation policy to wetlands).
162. Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envd. Prot. Agency, No. 3:05-cv-01876-AC,
2012 WL 653757 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2012).
163. Id. at *19.
164. Id. EPA argued that, although states are required to identify methods for im-
plementing their antidegradation policy, those methods need not be contained
in the state's regulation.
165. Id. at *18 (citing PUD No. I offefferson Cnsy, 511 U.S. at 705). EPA inter-
preted this provision as disallowing "both unacceptable threats to uses and
actual use impairment." Id
166.Id. at *17 18.
167. Brawer, supra note 127, at 23 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-317 (1997)).
168. Id. at 23-24, citing Region VIII EPA letter to Gov. Marc Racicot 3-5 (Dec.
1998)).
169. American Wildlands v. Browner (American Wiands 1), 94 E Supp. 2d 1150,
1150 (D. Colo. 2000), affd, 260 E3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001).
170. American Wildlands v. Browner (American Wildlandsll), 260 F.3d 1192, 1195
(10th Cit. 2001) (citing Mor. CODE ANN. § 75-5-317(2)(b)). This exemp-
tion did not apply to ONRWs. See American WidandsI, 94 E Supp. at 1159
n.5.
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public scrutiny.183 The Montana Supreme Court held that
the agency's unsupported statement that a perpetual dis-
charge from the adit would always be sufficiently treated
did not justify its determination that the discharge would
be "nonsignificant." 4
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the state agency's
identification of two parameters for the purpose of making
"nonsignificance" determinations, triggering the application
of antidegradation review to the discharge of coalbed meth-
ane produced waters.85 A federal district court, however,
subsequently remanded EPAs approval of Montana's rules
adopting numerical standards for the two parameters because
EPA failed to consider industry's concerns about the alleged
lack of scientific support for the standards.86 In critiquing
EPA's explanation that the two parameters "may" be harm-
ful, the court spuriously concluded, without any supporting
rationale or citations, that "[a]pproving a state standard on
the basis that a parameter may be harmful is certainly not
what the Clean Water Act envisioned."1 7 The court failed to
recognize that the CWA reflects Congress's intent to protect
water quality against threats of uncertain magnitude, requir-
ing, for example, that total maximum daily loads include "a
margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowl-
edge concerning the relationship between effluent limita-
tions and water quality.""
These cases indicate that, once a properly adopted state
antidegradation program is in place, states have consider-
able discretion to accommodate discharges into Tier 1 and 2
waters to promote economic and social goals, provided they
comply with regulatory procedures and supply some eviden-
tiary support for their substantive determinations.
3. As Applied Challenges to Tier 3 Waters Issues
Courts have been somewhat less deferential in reviewing
permitting decisions that impact Tier 3 waters (ONRWs),
at least when it comes to new or expanded uses with clear
impacts on water quality.'" In League to Save Lake Tahoe
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the court held that the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency arbitrarily allowed addi-
tional mooring buoys, piers, and other forms of development
in its shoreline ordinances.' The ordinances would have
allowed increased motor boating, which in turn would cause
increased pollutant discharges and runoff into Lake Tahoe,
183. Id. at 489.
184. Id. at 493. See also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Mont. Dep't of Envl. Quality,
234 P.3d 51, 58 (Mont. 2010) (invalidating permits to coalbed methane pro-
duction operation that authorized discharge into high-quality waters of mil-
lions of pounds of sodium each year, even though high salinity levels already
had impaired the river).
185. Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Envl. Review, 199 P.3d 191, 199 (Mont.
2008).
186. Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Envl. Prot. Agency, 692 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (D.
Wyo. 2009).
187. Id. at 1314.
188. CWA § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2006).
189. See League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 739 E Supp.
2d 1260, 1268 (E.D. Cal. 2010), affd in part, eacatedin part on orher grounds,
and remanded, 469 E App'x. 621 (9th Cit. 2012).
190. Id. at 1266, 1268.
which California had classified as an ONRW.191 Although
the Agency proposed mitigation measures, including "no
wake" zones, speed limits, and user fees, the court found that
its determination that there would be no significant water
quality impacts was arbitrary.192
Along the same lines, a Minnesota court set aside a per-
mit allowing a city to triple the capacity of a wastewater
treatment plant and discharge nearly two million gallons
of waste each day into an ONRW river."' The state's anti-
degradation rules prohibited any new or expanded dis-
charges into an ONRW unless there was no prudent and
feasible alternative, and then only "to the extent neces-
sary to preserve the existing high quality" of the receiving
water.194 The court held that the state permitting agency
failed to provide substantial evidence that the alternative
of downsizing the treatment plant and using decentralized
treatment was not feasible.'" The court also held that the
permitting agency erroneously restricted the discharge only
to prevent degradation below ordinary water quality stan-
dards rather than to protect the existing high quality of the
water.'9 Finally, by failing to define the baseline existing
quality of the water, the permitting agency could not evalu-
ate whether the proposed discharge would preserve existing
high quality.'97
In a subsequent case, however, the Minnesota court
rejected a challenge to a permit alleged to be in violation
of Minnesota's antidegradation rules. 98 An environmental
group claimed that the state agency failed to consider the
impact of the introduction of new invasive species through
ballast water discharges into Lake Superior.'" The court
deferred to the agency's technical expertise that discharges
need only be restricted "to the extent necessary to preserve
the existing high [water] quality."20' Although analysis of the
impact of new invasive species on the lake's quality might
have been prudent, the agency's failure to address the risks
associated with species that had already or might in the future
arrive as a result of ballast water discharges was not arbitrary
where the Lake had been "receiving ballast-water pollutants
without restriction for as long as commercial vessels have
operated on Lake Superior."201 Similarly, in Port of Seattle v.
191. Id. at 1291-92.
192. Id. at 1268.
193. Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. C'mmr ofMinn. Pollution Control Agency,
696 N.W.2d 95, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
194. Id. at 101.
195. Id at 105. Cf Minn. Ctr. for Envl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control
Agency, 660 N.W2d 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (invalidating general per-
mit for stormwater discharges as violation of antidegradation rules because the
state agency failed to consider whether discharges were expanded).
196. Minn. Crr. fr EnotL Advocacy, 696 N.W2d at 107.
197. Id. at 108.
198. In re Request for Issuance of the SDS General Permit MNG300000 for Ballast
Water Discharges, 769 NW.2d 312, 315 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 321.
201. Id. at 322. See, e.g., In re La. Dep't of Envl, Quality Permitting Decision: Tim-
berBranch II Sewage Treatment Plan, No. 2010 CA 1236, 2011 WL 1225985
(La. App. 1 Cir. 2011) (affirming agency's decision that discharges of treated
sewage would not degrade water quality in ONRW tributary); In re Freshwater
Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 415 (2004) (affirming New Jersey's au-
thorization of cranberry growing operations in the ONRWs of the Pinelands
National Reserves).
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on its belief that "the Act nowhere gives the EPA the author-
ity to regulate nonpoint source discharges." 71
Conversely, in Northwest EnvironmentalAdvocates v. EPA,
the court was unmoved by EPAs assertion that it lacked
authority to "review and potentially disapprove Oregon's
nonpoint source provisions as a part of its water quality stan-
dards review."1 2 The court declined to follow American Wild-
lands, explaining that because "many temperature impaired
waters in Oregon are impaired in whole or in part by non-
point sources of pollution, the challenged provisions could
present a considerable obstacle to the attainment of water
quality standards when, by law, the sources of pollution are
deemed to be in compliance with water quality standards."173
The court noted that one function of water quality standards
is to achieve federally-approved water quality goals through
both state controls and "federal strategies other than point-
source technology-based limitations," and that "[t]his pur-
pose pertains to waters impaired by both point and nonpoint
sources of pollution."1 4
2. As Applied Challenges to Tier I and 2 Waters
Issues
Other judicial challenges have focused on more discrete
aspects of state antidegradation provisions applicable to one
or more of the three tiers of waters. In some of these "as
applied" cases, judicial interpretation has watered down
antidegradation requirements, such as in a pair of North
Dakota cases involving the approval of permits allowing
phosphorous discharges into high-quality waters because of
the purported economic and social importance of the dis-
charging activities."
171. American Wildlands II, 260 F.3d at 1198. See aho Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S.
Envd. Prot. Agency, 415 EM 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005) ("the CWA does
not require states to take regulatory action to limit the amount of nonpoint
water pollution introduced into its waterways"). But f Montana Envrl. Info.
Ctr. v. Dep't of Envl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999) (finding that a
state statute exempting a gold mine's discharges of arsenic-laced water into
rivers that provided habitat for endangered species from the antidegradation
review process violated the state's constitutional provision guaranteeing its citi-
zens a right to a dean and healthy environment).
172. Northwest Envrl. Advocates v. U.S. Envd. Prot. Agency, No. 3:05-cv-0 1876-
AC, 2012 WL 653757, at *17 18 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2012). Plaintiffs challenged
several regulations that essentially exempted various nonpoint sources of heat
pollution from complying with water quality standards from antidegradation
review "so long as they do not increase in frequency, intensity, duration, or
geographical extent." Id at * 11.
173. Id. at *13.
174. Id. at *17 (citing Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Pronsolno paved the way for this decision by finding that EPAs TMDL regula-
tions "Focused on the attainment of water quality standards regardless of the
source of rhe pollution." Id at *9 (emphasis added). Disputes have also arisen
over the applicability of state antidegradation programs to other types of activi-
ties. See, e.g., W Va. Coal Ass'n v. Reilly, 728 E Supp. 2d 1276 (S.D. W. Va.
1989), afd, 932 F.3d 964 (Table), 33 Envt Rep. Cas. (BNA) No. 1353 (4th
Cir. 1991) (upholding EPAs authority to object to state's issuance of permit to
coal mining operation that would involve use of streams for waste assimilation
and treatment, in violation of the antidegradation policy).
175. See People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep't of Health, 697
N.W.2d 319, 330-31 (N.D. 2005) (upholding outlet permit for discharge into
category 1 lake because the addition of phosphorus would not alter the ben-
eficial use of waters, the agency adequately considered other, less degrading
alternatives, and the agency determined that the outlet was part of a project
designed to accommodate social and economic factors in the affected regions);
An Alabama court's rejection of an environmental
group's attack on a state antidegradation regulation high-
lights the difficulties of challenging findings that economic
necessity justifies degradation.'76 The court upheld a regu-
lation allowing a permit applicant to meet its obligation
to provide "alternatives" to discharges into Tier 2 waters
simply by showing that the project's costs did not exceed a
threshold for annualized costs.17 7 The court characterized
the rule as "a compromise between environmental and
broader economic concerns [that] the judiciary should be
loath to disturb."17' The court reasoned that the state per-
mitting agency needed the discretion to decide whether,
at some level, the needs of the state's people would be bet-
ter served by placing upper limits on the costs of indus-
trial plants than by "requiring massive and inefficient
expenditures in order to achieve marginal improvements
in water quality."179
In a few cases, the antidegradation policy has constrained
the issuance of discharge permits.'" Most commonly, courts
have rejected permits for discharges into Tier 2 waters
because of the absence of any findings of necessary economic
or social development.' Permitting decisions that blatantly
ignore the need to justify degradation of Tier 2 waters, then,
are likely to be more vulnerable than decisions purporting to
rest on a finding of necessity.
The courts have also served as a check on agency efforts
to exempt projects from antidegradation protections. In
one case, for example, a Montana agency declined to apply
the state's antidegradation policy to discharges from a mine
adit based on a regulation exempting "nonsignificant"
discharges into Tier 2 waters.182 Had the policy applied,
the discharges would have been subject to significantly
more stringent controls, and the process for reviewing
the mine's permit application would have entailed more
People to Save Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dept of Health, 744 N.W.2d
748 (N.D. 2008) (upholding modification of permit for lake outlet because
it would not cause concentration of any parameter of concern to increase by
more than fifteen percent); see also Community Ass'n for Restoration of the
Env't v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 205 P.3d 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (uphold-
ing general permit for confined animal feeding operations that required soil
but not groundwater monitoring).
176. Ala. Dept of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Legal Envl. Assistance Found., 922 So. 2d 101
(Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
177. Id at 108.
178. Id. at 114.
179. Id. at 113.
180. See, e.g., Hughey v. Gwinnect Cnty., 609 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. 2004) (invalidating
issuance of a permit to a wastewater treatment plant because, even though the
administrative law judge appropriately found the requisite necessity, the permit
failed to meet the state antidegradation policy's requirement that the county
use the best practicable treatment technology).
181. See, e.g., Ill. EPA v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 896 N.E. 2d 479 (Ill. App. Ct.
2008) (finding that the permitting agency's record lacked data showing that the
increased discharge was unavoidable or necessary, did not discuss other feasible
alternatives that might have negated the necessity of the increased discharge,
and did not contain information regarding the possibility of other methods to
eliminate or reduce phosphorus and/or nitrogen before discharging wastewater
into stream); see also Columbus & Franklin Cnty. Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank,
600 N.E.2d 1042, 1057-59 (Ohio 1992) (concluding that astate agency acted
arbitrarily in deciding that degradation of water quality in a creek was "neces-
sary to accommodate important economic or social development").
182. Clark Fork Coal. v. Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Qual., 197 P.3d 482, 493 (Mont.
2008).
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PCHB, a Washington court affirmed the agency's conclusion
that an airport runway project would satisfy the state's anti-
degradation policy despite potential impacts to stream flows
in class AA waters, the equivalent of ONRWs.202 It seemed
to take comfort in the fact that under the state's policy, the
developer must offset the impacts of the project, even though
it need not restore the AA waters to pristine condition.203
C. Antidegradation Policy Deficiencies
The cases described above demonstrate that the CWAs
antidegradation policy is neither fulfilling its potential for
identifying and protecting high-quality waters, nor meet-
ing the five goals delineated above in Part I. These deficien-
cies fall into several categories: (1) failure to ensure that
high-quality waters receive proper designation; (2) failure
to define "degradation" and to identify appropriate triggers
for preventing it in the face of "important" economic con-
siderations; and (3) failure to regulate all significant sources
of degradation. A fourth defect-the failure to detect inad-
equate antidegradation plans and follow through with
appropriate enforcement-is revealed by on-the-ground
implementation issues arising outside of the litigation con-
text. This part explores each of these deficiencies, while
Part IV sets forth proposed reforms.
I. Designation Inconsistencies
EPA's antidegradation policy does not provide adequate
guidance on how to distinguish Tier 1 from Tier 2 waters. 204
EPA allows states to take either a pollutant-by-pollutant or
water body-by-water body approach, with few substantive
parameters. Likewise, EPA's definition of Tier 3 is illustrative
rather than prescriptive, and its approach to state-by-state
designation is wholly discretionary.205 Accordingly, some
state regulations provide no procedural or substantive speci-
fications whatsoever for designation decisions, leaving many
high-quality waters unprotected beyond the lowest common
denominator-Tier 1.
2. What Is "Degradation" and When Is It
Allowed?
In addition to the designation vagaries described above, one
key question is how to define "degradation." EPAs regula-
tions utterly fail to recognize the relevance of that question.206
EPA apparently allows states to limit Tier 2 protections to
activities that result in "significant" degradation of water
quality, invoking an inherent authority to avoid regulating
de minimis environmental threats. 207 State definitions of the
202. Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 90 P3d 659, 681 (Wash.
2004).
203. Id.
204. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
206. Harleston, supra note 27, at 57.
207. Gaba, New Growth, supra note 15, at 677. See Ohio Valley Enytl. Coal. v.
Horinko, 279 E Supp.2d 732, 767-68 (S.D. W. Va. 2003); see also Kent
point at which impairment triggers antidegradation review
are inconsistent. 20t Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Kentucky Waterways Alliance indicates,209 the antidegrada-
tion policy fails to protect against the cumulative effects of
multiple discharges that impair existing water quality.210
A related flaw is the failure to describe just how "necessary"
and "important" economic or social development must be to
allow degradation of Tier 2 high-quality waters. 211 Accord-
ing to EPA, the phrase seeks to convey "a general concept
regarding what level of social and economic development
could be used to justify a change in high-quality waters. Any
more exact meaning will evolve thorough case-by-case appli-
cation .. ."212 The burden of demonstrating economic impor-
tance is supposed to "be very high."21 1 State regulations differ
markedly in how they apply this requirement, however. 214
Absent constraints, the exception threatens to swallow the
antidegradation rule.215
3. What Pollution Sources Are Regulated?
In addition to the inconsistencies in defining "degradation"
and "important" development, troublesome gaps have devel-
oped through the exclusion of certain pollution sources.
In the intermountain west, for example, "the regions anti-
degradation policies are riddled with exemptions. The most
common exemption is for existing sources-all eight states
'grandfather' existing sources if they are not expanding
their discharges."216 Only a few states in the region-Ari-
zona, Wyoming, and New Mexico-appear to meet EPA's
requirement that new and expanded discharges in tribu-
taries of ONRWs be limited to those that will not degrade
water quality.217 Exceptions for nonpoint sources-existing
or new-are equally widespread. Although a few states-
Modesitt, Antidegradation: A Lost Cause or the Next Cause?, 2 U. DENv. WATER
L. REv. 189, 217 (1999) (noting that an EPA regional office supported the use
of a significance determination).
208. See Modesitt, supra note 207, at 217 (noting that state approaches vary); FREY,
supra note 111, at 44 (finding that five of the eight intermountain states "ap-
ply some sort of numeric, percent based measure of 'insignificant' degradation
(often called de minimis degradation) that is allowable without review").
209. Ky. Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466, 485 (6th Cir. 2008).
210. See Adler, supra note 109, at 285.
211. 40 C.ER. § 131.12(a) (2011).
212. QUESTIONS & ANsWERs, supra note 26, at 8.
213. Kalisek, supra note 20, at 12 (quoting U.S. ENvTL. PEoT. AGENCY, supra note
39, at 5 4.5).
214. FREY, supra note 111, at 39-41; ADLERET AL., supra note 73, at 202; Katherine
Zogas, The Clean WaterActsAmidegradadon PoBcy: Has It Been "Dumped?, 42
J. MARSHAu. L. REv. 209, 229-30 (2008); Gaba, New Growth, supra note 15,
at 686.
215. Stitts, supra note 19, at 1359. Butcf Ala. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt v. Legal Envtl.
Assistance Found., 922 So. 2d 114-15 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (rejecting claim
that portion of state program requiring showing of necessity for important eco-
nomic and social development for new or expanded discharges to Tier 2 waters
was void for vagueness). Cf Pac. Topsoils, Inc. v. Wash. Dept of Ecology; 238
P.3d 1201, 1210 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (rejecting contention that state anti-
degradation program was unconstitutionally vague as applied to placement of
fill material into wetlands without a permit).
216. FREY, supra note 111, at 44.
217. Id. at 52-53.
Winter 20 13
Copyright © 2013 Environmental Law Institute® and The George Washington University Law School, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission.
JOURNAL OF ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Winter 2013
like New Mexico,218 Washington, 219 and Florida220-apply
antidegradation provisions to all sources of pollution in
ONRWs-including nonpoint sources-many, if not most,
states appear to have no restrictions on nonpoint source dis-
charges whatsoever.221 As noted above, Montana's exemption
for nonpoint sources has been upheld, 222 leaving high-quality
waters in rural areas unprotected from the most significant
sources of water pollution. 223
4. Lack of Follow Up
Beyond the lessons learned from several decades of anti-
degradation litigation, it appears that some of the problems
associated with the implementation of the policy stem from
EPA's failure to follow up after a state adopts an antidegrada-
tion program. As evidenced by the Government Account-
ability Office's ("GAO") assessment of the Great Lakes
Initiative ("GLI"), the lack of follow through turns in part
on EPA's failure to issue a consistent permitting strategy for
the states. 224 The GLI amendment to the CWA required that
the eight Great Lakes states-Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin-include provisions consistent with EPA's GLI guidance
in their regulations and permit programs. 225 But according
to the GAO, the states' permitting structures are not consis-
tent with each other or with any overarching comprehensive
strategy. Moreover, EPA's attempts to assess the effectiveness
of the states' antidegradation policies have been hindered by
inadequate data.226 Even for priority pollutants, like dioxin
218. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
219. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-300(2)(e)(i), (iii) (2003); Hersh, supra note
131, at 232.
220. In Florida, "no degradation" of ONRWs and "Outstanding Florida Waters"
is allowed, "notwithstanding any other Department rules that allow water
quality lowering." See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 5 62-302.700(1) (2006).
See Christie C. Morgan, Challenges and Opportunities in Protecting Outstand-
ing National Resource Waters, 5-SPG NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 30, 33 (1991)
(citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. § 17-4.242(3)(b) (1989)). Interestingly,
the Florida legislature specifically prohibited horticultural peat mining-a key
economic driver in the statr-in Outstanding Florida Waters. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 373.414(6)(e)(2)(d) (West 2006).
221. See, e.g., FREY, supra note 111, at 54, tbl. 22 (listing Arizona, Colorado, Mon-
tana, and Nevada as lacking explicit nonpoint source controls); id at 53 ("The
manner in which the states have addressed nonpoint source pollution control
varies dramatically in the [intermountain] region.").
222. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. See also Douglas R. Williams,
When Voluntary Incentive-Based Controls Fail Structuringa Regulatory Response
to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WAsn. U. J.L. & POL Y 21, 40
(2002) ("For [some] states, increases in nonpoint source pollution that impair
existing uses would not be considered to violate state water quality standards
or the antidegradation policy, so long as designated uses are fully supported.").
223. Blumm & Warnock, supra note 20, at 108-09.
224. See U.S. GoVT AccouNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-82, GREAT LAKES INI-
TIArIvE: EPA NEEDS To BETTER ENsuRE THE COMPLETE AND CONSISTENT
IMPLEMENTATION OF WATER QUALrTY STANDARDs 28-29 (2005) [hereinafter
GsRET LAKES INITIATIVE], available athttp://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247244.
pdf. The 1990 amendments to the CWA require EPA to publish guidance for
the Great Lakes states on minimum standards, implementation procedures,
and antidegradation policies for protecting water quality.
225. See Great Lakes Critical Programs Act of 1990 5 1, Pub. L. No. 101-596, 104
Stat. 3000, 3000 (1990).
226. See GREnT LAKES INiTlATIVE, supra note 224, at intro. ("Attempts by EPA to as-
sess GLI's impact have been limited because of inadequate data or information
that has not been gathered for determining progress on dischargers' efforts to
reduce pollutants.").
and other bioaccumulative chemicals, sufficiently sensitive
measurements have not been developed. 227
The GAO concluded that the GLI has limited potential to
protect water quality for two primary reasons: (1) it focuses
primarily on point sources and (2) it condones flexible imple-
mentation procedures, like variances, that relieve discharg-
ers from stringent water quality standards. 28 Indeed, "the
GLI allows the repeated use of some of these flexibilities and
does not set a time frame for facilities to meet the GLI water
quality criteria." 229 Moreover, the inability to reliably mea-
sure pollutant concentrations hinders the implementation of
antidegradation policies. 230 The GAO's report advised EPA
to issue permitting strategies that provide for a more con-
sistent approach among the states and to gather and track
information that can be used to assess the progress of imple-
menting the antidegradation policy and its impact on reduc-
ing pollutant discharges and improving water quality. 231
If the well-funded, well-coordinated GLI has made
so little progress, it should be no surprise that antideg-
radation policies in other regions are lagging behind as
well. 232 As the River Network concluded in its report on
the intermountain west, "[t]he power of antidegradation
is vastly underdeveloped." 233
Ill. A Comparison ofAntidegradation
Programs and Public Land Management
Protection Regimes
Most federal public land management statutes include some
sort of antidegradation provision, ranging from outright
prohibitions against impairment of the land and its natu-
227. "Of the nine [bioaccumulative chemicals of concern] [("BCC")] for which
criteria have been established, only two--mercury and lindane-have EPA-
approved methods that will measure below those criteria levels." U.S. GoVT
AccoUNTABILITY OvsIcE, GAO-08-312T, STATEMENT OF DAVID MAURER,
EPA AND STTES HAVE MADE PROGRESS, BUT MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE
IF WATER QUAIITY GOALS ARE To BE ACHIEVED 2 (2008) [hereinafter EPA
AND STEs HAVE MADE PROGRESS], available at hrtp://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/120/118778.pdf
228. See GREAT LAKES INITIATIVE, supra note 224, at 3.
229. EPA AND STATES HAVE MADE PROGRESS, supra note 227, at 3.
230. See GREAT LAKES INToirsrVE, supra note 224, at 12, 20. "For example, because
chlordane has a water quality criterion of 0.25 nansograms per liter but can
only be measured down to a level of 14 nanograms per liter, it cannot always be
determined if the pollutant is exceeding the criterion." EPA AND STATES HAVE
MADE PROGREss, supra note 227, at 3.
231. See GREAT LAKES INTTIATIvE, supra note 224, at 35 36. A follow-up audit in
2005 concluded that accurate analytical methods and measurements are still
lacking, and that the use of variances, mixing zones, and other "permit flex-
ibilities" continues to hinder progress toward meeting the criteria. EPA AND
STATES HAvE MADE PROGRESs, supra note 227, at 4, 7. For a summary of EPA's
response to the GAO's critique, see id at 9.
232. Congress appropriated $475 sillion for Great Lakes restoration in the
2010 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. Law. No. 111-88. See ROBERT
ESWORTHY, CONG. RES. SERV., R41149, EPA APROrnrTIONs FoR FY
2011, at 25-26, available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.orglassets
crs/R41149.pdf. For analysis of the status of the nation's waters more gen-
erally, see THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SC., ECON. & THE ENVT,
THE STATE OF THE NATION's EcoSYSTEMS 2008 (2008), available at http://
www.heinzcenter.org/Ecosystems-files/The%2OState%20ofyo2Othe%20
Nation%27s%20Ecosystems%202008.pdf (reporting on the continued deg-
radation of U.S. water bodies and sediments by chemical contaminants and
nutrients, especially froin nonpoint sources).
233. FREY, supra note 111, at 39.
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ral resources to more lenient provisions aimed at protecting
certain priority resources from destruction by incompatible
uses. This part considers an array of preservation-oriented
statutes governing wilderness areas, National Parks, Wildlife
Refuges, and Wild and Scenic Rivers, as well as a key conser-
vation-oriented statute that provides for sustained yields on
lands managed by the National Forest Service. These statutes
may apply directly to waters covered by the existing CWA
antidegradation policy, especially Tier 3 ONRWs, many of
which run through wilderness areas, parks, refuges, or other
protected areas. Even when the land management statutes do
not themselves apply to waters covered by the antidegrada-
tion policy, they may serve as models for strengthening the
protections of the aquatic environments that are, or should
be, covered by the CWAs antidegradation policy.
A. A Hierarchy of Protective Standards
I. The National Wilderness System
The Wilderness Act of 1964 is the nation's preeminent pres-
ervation statute.2 34 Today, federally designated wilderness
areas are found within National Forests, National Parks,
Wildlife Refuges, and lands managed by the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM"). 235 There are nearly seven hundred
wilderness areas in forty-four states, covering 109 million
acres of land. 236
The fundamental purpose of the Wilderness Act is to
secure the present and future benefits of untrammeled wild
lands for the public.237 To accomplish this goal, the Act spec-
ifies that wilderness areas shall be managed "in such manner
as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment
as wilderness, and so as to provide for ... the preservation of
their wilderness character. . 238 It also directs the manag-
ing agencies to protect and manage wilderness areas "so as to
preserve natural conditions." 239
In 1977, not long after the advent of the CWA's antideg-
radation policy, Dean William Hines called antidegradation
"the pollution control analogue to wilderness protection in
234. See Sandra Zellmer, Wilderness, Water, and Climate Change, 42 ENvrT. L. 313,
316 (2012); William Rodgers, The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environ-
mencal Law. Origins and Morphology, 27 Lay. LA. L. Rnv. 1009 (2004).
235. Land Purchase Under the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act (FLTFA),
BumaU on LAND MGMT. ("ELM"), U.S. DEPT OF INTERIOR, http://www.blm.
govlcalsdlen/prog/lands/fltfalland acquisition.html (last updated Oct. 21,
2011).
236. See Russ W GoRTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31477, WILDERNESS: OVER-
VIEW AND STATIrIcs 4 (2008). Excluding Alaska, wilderness areas comprise
only three percent of the United States. Id.
237. See Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Backgrou nd and Mean-
ing, 45 Os. L. REv. 288, 309 (1966).
238. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006). For descriptions of "wilderness character," see
Jerry E Franklin & Gregory H. Aplet, Wilderness Ecosystems, in WILDERNESS
MANAGEMENT: STEWARDSHIP AND PROTECTION OF RESOURCES AND VALUES
269 70 (John C. Hendee & Chad P. Dawson eds., 2002) [hereinafter WILDER-
NESS MANAGEMFENT]; David N. Cole, Ecologicallmpacts ofVlderners Recreation
and Their Management, in WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT, supra, at 414-16 (dis-
cussing the balance ofobjectives between protecting wilderness ecosystems and
the quality of the visitor's experience).
239. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
public lands management."240 In implementation, however,
the Wilderness Act has proven far more protective than the
CWAs antidegradation policy.
To accomplish its preservation-oriented purposes, the
Wilderness Act prohibits activities that would impair or
otherwise detract from the wildness of wilderness areas. 241
Permanent roads as well as commercial activities are strictly
forbidden. 24 2 With some exceptions, the Act also precludes
motor vehicles, motorized equipment, mechanical transport,
aircraft landings, structures, and installations.243 One of
these exceptions, found in section 4(c), allows such activi-
ties and facilities if they are "necessary to meet minimum
requirements for the administration of the area . .. (includ-
ing measures required in emergencies involving the health
and safety of persons within the area)." 244
Courts have construed this exception narrowly.245 In a
case involving the Kofa Wilderness in Arizona, the Ninth
Circuit enjoined the construction and maintenance of tanks
to augment water supplies for bighorn sheep. 24 6 The court
found that, although wildlife conservation was undoubtedly
a legitimate management objective, the tanks were installa-
tions that unlawfully trammeled the wilderness. 247 Although
such installations might be useful to sheep threatened by
drought and high temperatures, the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service ("FWS") had failed to establish that they were
a necessary minimum requirement for wilderness adminis-
tration. 24 8 The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion
in Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, where it rejected the Park
Service's claim that transporting tourists in a passenger van
across a wilderness area to provide access to historical struc-
tures was "necessary" just because it made access more con-
240. Hines, supra note 8, at 645. Hines added: "Because air and water are to an ex-
tent renewable resources, their degradation may not involve all of the problems
of irreversibility that are raised in the destruction of other natural environ-
ments. Therefore, it might be expected that the policy would be applied most
stringently when the threatened air and water resources either themselves are
subject to irreversible damage or are inextricably related to other natural sys-
tems subject to such harm." Id. at 652-53.
241. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(b). See Californians for Alts. to Toxics v. U.S. Fish & Wild-
life Serv., 814 E Supp. 2d 992, 1014-17 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (agencies that
manage wilderness are "responsible for preserving ... wilderness character";
"the Act is intended to enshrine the long-term preservation of wilderness areas
as the ultimate goal") (citing Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010)). The principal author of the Wil-
derness Act, Howard Zahniser, viewed the term "wild" as synonymous with
'untrammeled": "not subject to human controls and manipulations that ham-
per the free play of natural forces." Zellmer, supra note 234, at 10.
242. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2006). See Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1061-63 (9th Cir. 2003), as amendedon rehk en banc in
part, 360 E3d 1374 (9th Cit. 2004) (enjoining commercial salmon enhance-
ment project); Barnes v. Babbitt, 329 E Supp. 2d 1141, 1154 (D. Ariz. 2004)
(invalidating a plan that allowed repairs and maintenance of access routes as
unlawful road construction).
243. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c).
244. Id.
245. See Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. EsVs.. L.J. 62, 82
(2010) [hereinafter Appel, Wilderness and the Courts]; Peter A. Appel, Wil-
derness, the Courts, and the Effect of Politics on Judicial Decisionmaking 35
HAnv. ENVTL. L. REv. 275, 293-94 (2011) (finding that courts are more
likely to uphold wilderness-protective decisions than they are wilderness-
impacting decisions).
246. Wilderness Watch, Inc., 629 E3d at 1024.
247. Id. at 1033 34.
248. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2006)).
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venient and had "no net increase" in impacts to the land. 249
Likewise, in Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. US.
Fish and Wildlife Service, a federal district court disagreed
with the Forest Service that the application of rotenone was
necessary to promote the recovery of the Paiute Cutthroat
Trout and to preserve wilderness character. 250 The agency
improperly neglected the well-being of other endemic spe-
cies in the wilderness. 251
The second exception for otherwise non-conforming activ-
ities in wilderness areas, section 4(d), authorizes "such mea-
sures . . . as may be necessary in the control of fire, insects,
and diseases." 252 The only published opinions directly on
point involve the Forest Service's efforts to control the south-
ern pine beetle. 253 In the first of two related cases, the court
remanded a proposal for extensive chemical spraying and
logging as "wholly antithetical to the wilderness policy estab-
lished by Congress," and "hardly consonant with preserva-
tion and protection of these areas in their natural state."25 4
The court explained that "[o]nly a clear necessity for upsetting
the equilibrium of the ecology could justify this highly inju-
rious, semi-experimental venture of limited effectiveness." 255
In the second case, the court upheld a pared down version
of the proposal that used "spot control" logging to combat
infestations. 256 It approved measures that "fall short of full
effectiveness" so long as they are "reasonably designed" to
limit infestation.257 The court was careful to note, however,
that the agency had significantly scaled back its plan and had
adopted several preservation-oriented safeguards. 25 8
The Wilderness Act has been a significant factor in pre-
venting the degradation of federally designated wilder-
ness areas.259 Of course, there is room for criticism. Some
commentators argue that "managers have extensively
manipulated wilderness to achieve desired ends." 260 But the
Wilderness Act provides sufficiently detailed standards to
hold officials accountable. 261 Those standards afford greater
249. Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 E3d 1085, 1096 (11th Cit. 2004).
250. Californians for Alts. to Toxics v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 814 E Supp. 2d
992, 1019 (E.D. Cal. 2011). Rotenone is a powerful poison that kills every-
thing with gills.
251. Id However, where the agency makes extensive factual findings that otherwise
incompatible activities, such as motorized access, are necessary to preserve wil-
derness character, for example, by aiding "the restoration of a specific aspect of
the wilderness character . .. that had earlier been destroyed by man," its deci-
sion may be upheld. Wolf Recovery Found. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 692 F. Supp.
2d 1264, 1268 (D. Idaho 2010).
252. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1) (2006).
253. Sierra Club v. Lyng (Lyng 1), 662 E Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1987); Sierra Club v.
Lyng (Lyngll), 663 F. Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1987).
254. LyngI, 662 E Supp. at 43.
255. Id (emphasis added).
256. LyngII, 663 E Supp. at 556.
257. Id at 560.
258. Id at 557-59. The Forest Service assured the court that the activities would not
"unnecessarily sacrifice[ ]" wilderness values and were not aimed at promot-
ing commercial timber harvest. Id at 560. The court found that the primary
purpose of the agency's previous plan for a large-scale eradication program was
commercial in nature. LyngI, 662 E Supp. at 40.
259. SeeAppel, Wilderness and the Courts, supra note 245, at 129.
260. Gordon Steinhoff, Inrerpreting the Wilderness Act of1964, 17 Mo. ENvTL. L.
& PoL'v. REv. 492, 501 (2010); see also Gordon Steinhoff, 7he Wilderness Art,
Prohibited Uses, and Esceptionr How Much Manipulation of Wilderness Is Too
Much?, 51 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 287, 294 (2011).
261. See Appel, Wilderness in the Courts, supra note 245, at 66-67.
discretion to err on the side of overprotection of wilderness
than underprotection. Based on an empirical analysis of
wilderness litigation in the federal courts, Professor Peter
Appel found that agencies are far more successful in defend-
ing against claims that they protected wilderness too strin-
gently than that they provided inadequate protection.2 62
Appel described this phenomenon "as a one-way judicial
ratchet in favor of wilderness protection."263
Although the Wilderness Act is not a complete analogue
to the CWA, given its distinctive preservation-oriented edict
for lands that are owned solely by the federal government,
it can provide a few important lessons for improving the
antidegradation program. The explicit statutory prohibi-
tion against impairment with only a few narrowly crafted
statutory exceptions, coupled with the directive to preserve
wilderness character and natural conditions, gives agencies,
courts, and citizens substantial powers to prevent degrada-
tion.264 In addition, courts' willingness to require "a clear
necessity," not just convenience, to invoke exceptions to the
Act's preservation provisions could serve as a useful guide-
post for implementation of the necessity determination for
degradation of Tier 2 waters.265
2. The National Parks
One of the earliest expressions of an antidegradation require-
ment in federal law is found in the National Park Service
Organic Act of 1916 ("Organic Act").26 6 The Organic Act
requires the Park Service to manage the national parks "to
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects
and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of
the same in such manner . .. as will leave them unimpaired
for the enjoyment of future generations." 267 Thus, in mak-
ing decisions, the Park Service must "examine the duration,
severity, and magnitude of the impact; the resources and val-
ues affected; and direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of
262. Id.
263. Id. at 67.
264. See, e.g., LyngI 662 E Supp. at 43.
265. See supra note 249 (describing Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085
(11th Cit. 2004)); LyngI, 662 F. Supp. at 42 (emphasis added).
266. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
267. Id. A 1978 amendment to the Organic Act forbids the Park Service from exer-
cising its protection and management responsibilities "in derogation of the val-
ues and purposes" of the parks. Redwood Act of 1978, § 101(b), Pub. L. No.
95-250, 92 Stat. 163, 166 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (2006)).
The Park Service construes the "no dermgatio' standard as synonymous with
the non-impairment standard of the 1916 Organic Act, Nat'l Park Serv., Man-
agement Policies 2006 § 1.4.2 (2006) [hereinafter MANAGEMENT POLICIES
2006], available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/mp2006.pdf, and courts have
generally concurred. See, e.g., Sierra Club N. Star Chapter v. LaHood, 693
E Supp. 2d 958, 965, 983 (D. Minn. 2010); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Nat' Park Serv., 387 E Supp. 2d 1178, 1192 (D. Utah 2005); United States
v. Garfield Cnty., 122 E Supp. 2d 1201, 1244, 1249 (D. Utah 2000); see also
Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 E Supp. 2d 76, 97-103 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding
that decisions granting applications for exemptions from directional drilling
regulations were arbitrary and capricious because the Park Service failed to
explain its conclusion that impacts from nearby surface drilling activities, such
as air pollution, noise, light, water pollution, fire, or spills, would not impair
park resources and values), appeal dismissedper sqpulation, Nos. 06-5419, 07
5004, 2007 WL 1125716 (D.C. Cit. Mar. 30, 2007).
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the action." 268 If impairment would result, "the action must
not be approved." 269
Over the years, the National Park System has been wildly
popular with the American public, and it has grown to
include 397 national parks located in 49 states and several
U.S. territories. 27 0 But the dual mandate of the Organic
Act-to conserve park resources from impairment and also
to provide for the enjoyment of them-poses a significant
challenge for the Park Service, and it has not always pre-
vented degradation of park resources. 271 As Professor Rob-
ert Keiter has explained, the national parks are vulnerable
to outside development pressures that have the potential to
adversely affect wildlife, air and water quality, and surround-
ing landscapes. 272
Although the National Park System is not perfect in
terms of antidegradation, the Organic Act's non-impair-
ment requirement, coupled with its overarching conserva-
tion mandate, places substantive parameters on the Park
Service's discretion that minimize degradation and promote
long-term conservation of resources. 273 The Park Service
states that its conservation mandate, which extends to the
ecological, biological, and physical processes that sustain the
parks and their natural resources, "applies all the time, with
respect to all park resources and values, even when there is
no risk that any park resources or values may be impaired."274
Where uncertainties arise, the conservation concept acts as a
precautionary principle of sorts. The Park Service recognizes
that the "threshold at which impairment occurs is not always
readily apparent,"275 So it has committed itself to "apply a
standard that offers greater assurance that impairment will
not occur . . . by avoiding impacts that it determines to be
unacceptable." 276 It defines "unacceptable impacts" as those
that would individually or cumulatively conflict with a
park's purposes or values, interfere with uses of a park's natu-
268. Lower St. Croix National Scenic Riverway, 66 Fed. Reg. 56848, at 56850
(Nov. 13, 2001).
269. MANAGEMENT PoLICIES 2006, supra note 267, at § 1.4.7; seeTerbush v. United
States, 516 E3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cit. 2008) ("'Whether an individual action
is or is not an 'impairment is a management determination. In reaching it, the
manager should consider such factors as the spatial and temporal extent of the
impacts, the resources being impacted and their ability to adjust those impacts,
the relation of the impacted resources to other park resources, and the cumula-
tive as well as the individual effects.'") (quoting Nsr'L PARK SERV., 1988 MAN-
AGEMENT POLCIEs (1988))). In Terbush, the court rejected most of the tort
claims brought by the fianily of a deceased mountain climber under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, which shields federal agencies from liability for discretionary
activities. 28 U.S.C. 5 2680(a) (2006); Terbush, 516 U.S. at 1128 29. It con-
cluded that the Park Service had "considerable' discretion under its Manage-
ment Policies, including the non-impairment standard, grounded in the Act's
"broad mandate to balance conservation with access and safety." Terbsah, 516
U.S. at 1131-32.
270. About Us, NAr'L PARK SERv., http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm (last up-
dated Dec. 4, 2012).
271. Robert Keiter, The National Park System: Visions For Tomorroo, 50 NAT. RE-
soURCES J. 71, 72 73 (2010).
272. Id.
273. 16 U.S.C. 5 1 (2006).
274. MANAGEMERNT POLICIEs 2006, supra note 267, at §5 1.4.3, 1.4.6. However, the
Park Service asserts management discretion "to allow impacts to park resources
and values when necessary and appropriate to fulfill the purposes of a park, so
long as the impact does not constitute impairment of the affected resources
and values." Id
275. Id. § 1.4.7.1.
276. Id.
ral and cultural resources, diminish enjoyment by current or
future generations, or unreasonably interfere with the peace,
tranquility, or natural soundscape of wilderness and other
protected locations within the park.277
The courts have generally agreed that "when there is a con-
flict between conserving resources and values and providing
for enjoyment ofthem, conservation is to be predominant."278
They tend to uphold the Park Service's decisions to restrict
access and usage to ensure against impairment of resources
and thereby promote conservation. 279 In one case, a court
even found an affirmative duty to assert federal reserved
water rights for a unit of the National Park System-a can-
yon-that required instream flows to maintain its ecological
integrity.280 Thus, the Park Service's relatively stringent defi-
nitions of conservation, "impairment," and "unacceptable
impacts" could serve as useful guideposts in defining "anti-
degradation" of high-quality waters in the CWA context.
3. Wild and Scenic Rivers
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act ("WSRA") of 1968 cre-
ates a nationwide network of wild, scenic, and recreational
rivers.28' There are over two hundred rivers, encompassing
thousands of miles, in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System.282
In the WSRA, Congress declared a policy to preserve
the free-flowing characteristics and water quality of des-
ignated rivers.283 To be included, rivers must be free-flow-
ing and must also have "outstandingly remarkable" values
("CORV"). 2 " Upon designation, rivers are classified as wild,
scenic, or recreational. Wild rivers must be free of impound-
ments, "with watersheds or shorelines essentially primitive
277. Id.
278. Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 E Supp. 2d 92, 96-97, 101, 103 (D.D.C.
2003) (quoting NArIL PARK SERV., 2001 MANAGEMENrrr POLICIES 5 1.4.3
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that adoption of final
rule allowing 950 snowmobiles to enter Yellowstone and Grand Teton Na-
tional Parks each day was arbitrary and capricious), motion fr reliefflomjudg-
ment granted, 323 E Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2004), motion to amend denied, 326
E Supp. 2d 124 (D.D.C. 2004), appeal dismissedper stipulation, No. 03-5365,
2005 WIL 375622 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2005).
279. See Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 E3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir.
1996); Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 207 (6th
Cir. 1991); Organized Fishermen of Fla. v. Watt, 590 E Supp. 805, 812-14
(S.D. Fla. 1984), afd sub nom. Organized Fishermen of Fla. v. Hodel, 775
E2d 1544 (11th Cit. 1985); see also Keiter, supra note 271, at 87 ("When
confronted with challenges to these recreational limitations, federal courts have
consistently endorsed the Park Service's 'resource protection-first' interpreta-
tion of its legal responsibilities."). But see Denise Antolini, National Park Law
in the U.S.: Conservation, Conflict, and Centennial Values, 33 Wui. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 851, 891-96 (2009) (citing Davis v. Latschar, 202
E3d 349 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding a decision to conduct a controlled deer
hunt in Gettysburg National Military Park)); River Runners for Wilderness v.
Martin, No. 06-894, 2007 WL 4200677 (D. Ariz. 2007) (upholding a plan
to provide extensive access to commercial boaters on the Colorado River in
the Grand Canyon); Int'l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass'n v. Norton, 340 E Supp. 2d
1249 (D. Wyo. 2004) (remanding a decision to restrict snowmobiling)).
280. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242,
1246-53 (D. Colo. 2006).
281. 16 U.S.C. 5 1273(a) (2006); see Brian E. Gray, No Holier Temples: Protecting
the National Parks Through Wild and Scenic River Designation, 58 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 551, 552 (1988).
282. National Wild dr Scenic Rivers, U.S. NATL WILD & SCENIC Rsvxas, http://
www.rivers.gov/ (2012).
283. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2006).
284. Id. §§ 1273(b), 1271.
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and waters unpolluted."285 Scenic and recreational rivers are
also generally free of impoundments, but they may have
some development along their shorelines. 286
Wild river segments, which like wilderness areas are
"essentially primitive," are highly protected. 28 7  Rivers
classified as recreational or scenic are governed by more
lenient standards.2 Regardless of classification, dams are
prohibited, 289 and designated rivers must be administered in
a manner to "protect and enhance" their ORVs. 29 0 Moreover,
no federal department or agency may undertake or assist in
any "water resources project" that would have a "direct and
adverse effect" on a river's ORVs, 291 and deleterious projects
may be enjoined.292
In a series of Oregon cases decided in the late 1990s,
courts found that the BLM's management of grazing prac-
tices violated the WSRA. 29 In Oregon Natural DesertAssoci-
ation v. Green, the court remanded the BLM's management
plan for failure to consider whether grazing would "protect
and enhance" vegetative ORVs. 294 Grazing was subsequently
enjoined when the BLM's plan showed the negative impacts
of grazing on scenic and recreational values. 295
Although the Oregon cases indicate a willingness to engage
in probing judicial review of activities with undeniably det-
rimental effects on ORVs, courts have been inconsistent in
reviewing challenges to the Comprehensive Management
Plans ("CMP") for designated river segments. 29 In Friends of
285. Id § 1273(b)(1). Like wilderness areas, wild rivers "represent vestiges of primi-
tive Aneric." Id
286. Id § 1273(b)(2)-(b)(3) (2006). See Sierra Club v. Pena, 1 E Supp. 2d 971, 971
n. 6 (D. Minn. 1998); see also Sierra Club N. Star Chapter v. LaHood, 693 E
Supp. 2d 958, 964 (D. Minn. 2010).
287. 16 U.S.C. § 1273(b)(1) (2006); see Wilderness Watchy. U.S. Forest Serv., 143
F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1205 (D. Mont. 2000) (stating that hunting and fishing
lodges not allowed on wild river segments that should "represent vestiges of
primitive America"); see also Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Singleton, 75 E Supp.
2d 1139, 1139 (D. Or. 1999) (permanently enjoining grazing in the wild river
corridor); but see Riverhawks v. Zepeda, 228 E Supp. 2d 1173, 1183 (D. Or.
2002) (finding that recreational activities may interfere with aspects of a wild
river, but deferring to the agencys balance of values that allowed motorboats
continued access to the river).
288. 16 U.S.C. 8 1273(b)(2)-(3) (2006); see Friends of Yosemite Valleyv. Norton,
348 E3d 789, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2003) (remanding the management plan for
the Merced River for failure to protect and enhance the river's geological, bio-
logical, and cultural ORVs and for failing to address impacts of visitor use); see
also Sierra Club v. United States, 23 £ Supp. 2d 1132, 1140 (N.D Cal. 1998)
(refusing to enjoin the Park Service from re-building a lodge and re-routing
a road near scenic and recreational segments of the Merced River, and find-
ing that the project would not impinge on ORVs but instead would improve
accessibility and environmental conditions by moving buildings further from
the river).
289. 16 U.S.C. 8 1278(a) (2006); see Swanson Mining Corp. v. FERC, 790 E2d 96,
102-05 (D.C. Cit. 1986) (Wild and Scenic Rivers Act prevents FERC from li-
censing hydroelectric projects on designated rivers even if FERC believes there
would be no adverse effects to ORVs).
290. 16 U.S.C. 8 1281(a) (2006).
291. Id. 1278(b). Such projects include water diversions, transmission lines,
bridges, piers, levees, and boat ramps. See 36 C.ER. 8 297.3 (2011); Pena, 1
E Supp. 2d at 979 (concluding that a bridge that would result in changes to a
river's free-flowing characteristics was a "water resources project").
292. Pena, 1 E Supp. 2d at 981.
293. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Green, 953 £ Supp. 1133 (D. Or. 1997); Or.
Natural Desert Ass'n v. Singleton, 75 E Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1999).
294. Or. NaturalDesertAssn v. Green, 953 F Supp. at 1144.
295. Or. NaturalDesertAss'n a. Singleton, 75 E Supp. 2d a 141.
296. See 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d)(1) (2006) (requiring comprehensive management
plans ("CMP") within three years of designation).
Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, the court found that the lack
of a comprehensive CMP warranted enjoining nine redevel-
opment projects in a designated river corridor.29 7 Conversely,
in Center for Biological Diversity v. Lueckel, the court dis-
missed a complaint for lack of standing where the plaintiffs
failed to show a causal link between the authorization of
detrimental logging activities and the absence of a CMP. 298
According to the court, there was "no evidence" that CMPs
"typically provide for greater restrictions" than other types of
federal land management plans. 299
Like the CWA's antidegradation program, WSRA plan-
ning and management restrictions seem to be underutilized
tools. 00 As litigants have found, broad-brush challenges to a
management agency's discretion to balance competing uses
typically fail, but challenges that identify discrete, harm-
ful activities that violate specific obligations to "protect and
enhance" specific ORVs in a particular river segment may
gain more traction. 3t
4. National Wildlife Refuges
The statutory directive to conserve the resources of the
national wildlife refuges is analogous to the CWA's mandate
that high-quality waters be protected from degradation. The
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997
("NWRSIA") defines the mission of the Wildlife Refuge
System as the "conservation, management, and where appro-
priate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources
and their habitats . . . for the benefit of present and future
generations of Americans."302 Thus, conservation is the first
priority for wildlife refuges.3t9 The Act defines conservation
to include not only maintenance of existing refuge resources,
but also, where appropriate, restoration and enhancement of
healthy fish, wildlife, and plant populations.0 4 It directs the
297. Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cit.
2008); see also Sierra Club v. Babbit 69 E Supp. 2d 1202, 1252 (E.D. Cal.
1999) ("[Wqhere ... an agency has egregiously violated a procedural planning
requirement which is closely linked to the ability of the agency to adequately
assess the impacts of future plans and actions on the river's ORVs, that pro-
cedural violation lends great weight to assertions that the substantive require-
ment to preserve and enhance the values for which river was included in the
wild and scenic river system has been violated.").
298. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lueckel, 417 £3d 532, 534 (6th Cir. 2005);
see also In re Montana Wilderness Assn., 807 E Supp. 2d 990, 1000 (D.
Mont. 2011) (rejecting the argument that a plan's purported failure to address
motorized uses and user capacities violated the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
("WSRA") when the BLM had balanced competing values of solitude and
recreation by imposing road closures and seasonal restrictions while reaffirming
long-standing uses).
299. Ctr. fr BiologicalDiversity, 417 E3d at 540. The court found no evidence that
a CMP would provide greater protection than the existing forest plan, which
stated that designated river corridors "will be managed to protect and enhance
the values for which the river was designated."
300. See Murray Feldman et al., Learning to Manage Our Wild and Scenic River
System, 20 NAT. RES. & ENv'T 10, 70 (2005) (although the WSRA "provides
a unique blend of conservation, development, and use for its river segment
components ... the managing agencies ... are finding it difficult to give pri-
ority to wild and scenic rivers in these times of reduced budgets for resource
management activities").
301. Id.
302. 16 U.S.C. 8 668dd(a)(2) (2006).
303. 3 GEORGE CAMERON CoGGINS & ROBERT L. GLIcKsMAN, PUBLIC NATuRAL
REsoURCES LAw § 24:5 (2nd ed. 2007) (citing 16 U.S.C. 8 668dd(a)(4)(D)).
304. 16 U.S.C. § 668ee(4) (2006).
18
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FWS to conserve fish, wildlife, plants, and their habitats, and
to ensure maintenance of biological integrity, diversity, and
environmental health within the Wildlife Refuge System.3 0
According to Professor Robert Fischman, the NWRSIA's
substantive management criteria provide "relatively rich
detail. . . compared to previous federal organic statutes." 06
To achieve the Wildlife Refuge System's conservation goals,
the Act allows only "compatible uses" that "will not materi-
ally interfere with or detract from the fulfillment of" the
System's mission or individual refuge purposes.3 07 FWS
regulations preclude any new use or expansion, renewal, or
extension of an existing use unless it is deemed a compat-
ible use. "The FWS must either terminate the incompatible
use or modify it to make it compatible. 09 Economic uses
of refuge resources-livestock grazing, mineral develop-
ment, and other uses conducted for a profit-must satisfy
an additional requirement:310 such uses must contribute to
the achievement of the refuge purposes or the Wildlife Ref-
uge System mission. 1 '
Under the FWS regulations, compatibility determina-
tions are typically made as part of the comprehensive con-
servation plan ("CCP") for each refuge,3 12 but compatibility
may be reevaluated at any time,"' such as when changed
305. Id. § 668dd(a) (4). An executive order issued by President Clinton characterizes
the conservation duty as a "trustee and stewardship" responsibility: "[flish and
wildlife will not prosper without high-quality habitat, and without fish and
wildlife, traditional uses of refuges cannot be sustained. The Refuge System will
continue to conserve and enhance the quality and diversity of fish and wildlife
habitat within refuges." Exec. Order No. 12996, 61 Fed. Reg. 13647 (Mar. 25,
1996) (emphasis added).
306. Robert L. Fischman, From Words to Action: The Impact and Legal Status of the
2006 National Wildlife Refuge System Management Policies, 26 STAN. ENvT.
LJ. 77,79 (2007).
307. 16 U.S.C.§ 668ee(1).
308. 50 C.F.R. § 26.41 (2012).
309. Id. § 26.41(d).
310. Id. § 29.1 (2012). The FWS's manual for wildlife refuges defines economic use
as "[anny activity involving the use of a refuge or its resources for a profit." U.S.
FisH & WILDLIFE SERv., REFUGE MANUAL, 5 FW § 17.6(D) (2000) [hereinaf-
tet REFUGE MANUAL]. In a separate FWS policy, the term "refuge management
economic activity" is defined as " [a] refuge management activity ons a national
wildlife refuge that resulrs in generation of a commodity which is or can be
sold for income or revenue or traded for goods or services." Id. at 603 FW
§ 2.6(N) (2000). See Del. Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Salazar, 829 F Supp. 2d
273, 289-90 (D. Del. 2011) (finding that a dune restoration project was not
an economic use, where sand would not be sold but would be used to restore
beaches and dunes).
311. 50 C.UR. § 29.1. See Del. Audubon Soc'y., Inc. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dept of
the Interior, 612 E Supp. 2d 442 (D. Del. 2009) (enjoining decision to allow
cooperative farming and farming with genetically modified crops in a refuge
without first preparing a written compatibility determination); Stevens Cnty.
v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 507 E Supp. 2d 1127, 1133-35 (E.D. Wash. 2007)
(FWS's determination that livestock grazing was not a compatible use was en-
titled to deference; although some studies showed the grazing could have a
positive impact on habitat, other studies demonstrated the negative effects of
grazing on migratory bird populations and riparian habitats, and site-specific
studies demonstrated that grazing materially interfered with wildlife manage-
ment on the refuge); see alo Wilderness Socy v. Babbitt, 5 E3d 383 (9th Cir.
1993) (remanding FWS's decision to renew grazing permits where the FWS
failed to consider the incompatibility of grazing with refuge purposes, even
in the face of report of the refuge manager that current grazing practices were
harming fish and wildlife habitats).
312. See 50 C.UR 8 26.41 (2012) ("We will usually complete compatibility deter-
miations as part of the comprehensive conservation plan or step-down man-
agement plan process for individual uses, specific use programs, or groups of
related uses described in the plan").
313. Id. § 25.21(f) (2012); see also id. § 25.21(b) ("We may open a national wildlife
refuge for any refuge use, or expand, renew, or extend an existing refuge use
conditions or significant new information concerning the
effects of the use exist."t The FWS Manual emphasizes that
the first goal of a CCP is "[t]o ensure that wildlife comes first
in the National Wildlife Refuge System."'
Although recreational impacts could undercut the con-
servation mission, the statute identifies wildlife-dependent
recreation, such as hunting and fishing, as a preferred (pre-
sumptively compatible) use of the Wildlife Refuge System.1
Together, the statute and the FWS management policies
guard against this possibility by imposing biological integ-
rity, diversity, and environmental health as criteria for decid-
ing whether to allow wildlife-dependent recreation."
A potential deficiency in the statutory scheme is the fail-
ure to apply the compatibility requirement to the FWS's own
management actions. In Fund fir Animals v. Clark,1"" the
district court held that the FWS had no statutory duty to
conduct a compatibility analysis of its feeding programs for
bison and elk in the National Elk Refuge because activities
conducted by refuge managers were not refuge "uses" within
the meaning of the Act." The court interpreted the statutory
list of "uses" governed by the compatibility requirement to be
limited to those performed by third parties or the public.320
It bolstered this conclusion by referencing section 668dd(c),
which it construed as "specifically exempt[ing] from the com-
patibility requirement actions taken by 'persons authorized
to manage' the refuge area."3 21 The FWS has since adopted
a regulation defining "refuge use" as use "by the public or
other non-National Wildlife Refuge System entity."3 22
Despite this gap, the stewardship responsibilities embed-
ded in the broadly applicable statutory conservation man-
date should guide decisionmakers to prevent impairment of
only after the Refuge Manager determines that it is a compatible use and not
inconsistent with any applicable law").
314. Id. § 25.21(f).
315. REFUGE MANUAL, 602 FW 8 3.3.A (2000). Comprehensive conservation plans
are required by 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e) and 50 C.ER. § 26.41.
316. See 16 U.S.C. 8 668dd(3)(a)(iii) (2006) ("Wildlife-dependent recreational uses
may be authorized on a refuge when they are compatible and not inconsistent
with public safety. Except for consideration of consistency with State laws and
regulations as provided for in subsection (m) of this section, no other deter-
minations or findings are required ... for wildlife-dependent recreation to
occur."). Wildlife-dependent uses include hunting, fishing, wildlife observa-
tion and photography, and environmental education and interpretation. Id.
§ 668ee(2) (2012).
317. Fischman, supra note 306, at 111-12 (citing REFUGE MANUAL, 605 FW
88 1.13(B), 1.8(B), (D)(3) (2000)). See also Appropriate Refuge Uses, U.S. FIsH
& WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/policy/601fw3.htnl (last updated
April 16, 2001).
318. Fund for Animals v. Clark, 27 E Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 1998).
319. Id. at 12.
320. Id at 11 (citing 16 U.S.C. 8 668dd(1)(A)-(B)). A district court in Delaware
fiund that a FWS dune restoration project was within the agency's "sound
professional judgment" and upheld the FWSs compatibility determination,
without analyzing whether the FWS was statutorily required to meet the com-
patibility requirement. Del. Audubon Soc'y v. Salazar, 829 E Supp. 2d 273,
287-90 (D. Del. 2011).
321. Clark, 27 E Supp. 2d at 11 (citing 16 U.S.C. 8 668dd(c)). Subsection 668dd(c)
sets forth the general prohibitions against any persons disturbing or possessing
"any real or personal property of the United States, including natural growth,
in any area of the System," or taking or possessing any wild animals within
refuges, "unless such activities are performed by persons authorized to manage
such area, or unless such activities are permitted ... [as compatible uses] inder
subsection (d)...." 16 U.S.C. 8 668dd(c) (emphasis added).
322. See 50 C.ER. § 25.12(a) (2012).
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refuge resources.3 23 Courts have been willing to uphold FWS
decisions to limit access to protect refuge resources, 324 but
they have been equally inclined to uphold FWS decisions to
allow use. 3 25 Thus, discretion can cut both ways. Yet, as indi-
cated in Part IV below, the NWRSIAs directive to "ensure
that the biological integrity, diversity, and environmental
health of the System are maintained for the benefit of pres-
ent and future generations," 26 coupled with its compatibility
requirement, is useful in the effort to supply a meaningful
definition of degradation under the CWA.
5. Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Management by
the Forest Service
The U.S. Forest Service manages the lands under its juris-
diction under a multiple use, sustained yield mandate that
is less preservation-oriented than the management regimes
discussed above.327 Yet the organic statute for the Forest Ser-
vice provides some protection against degradation of certain
resources, and therefore may be relevant to achieving the
goals of the antidegradation policy.
The management and planning provisions of the National
Forest Management Act of 1976 ("NFMA") guide the Forest
Service in seeking an appropriate mix of uses in the National
Forest System.328 The statute requires forest plans to assure
that land productivity is not substantially and permanently
impaired.2 In addition, forest plans must prevent irrevers-
ible damage to soil, slope, or other watershed conditions and
protect streams and other bodies of water from detrimental
changes if harvests are likely to adversely affect water condi-
tions or fish habitat.3 0 According to the courts, Congress
delegated to the Forest Service the discretion to balance these
protections while providing for multiple uses of the forests."'
323. Fischman, supra note 306, at 111.
324. See Niobrara River Ranch, L.L.C. v. Huber, 277 E Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Neb.
2003), affd, 373 E3d 881 (8th Cit. 2004) (affirming FWS's decision to limit
recreational rafting and canoeing in a refuge).
325. See Wilderness Socy v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serw, 316 E3d 913 (9th Cit.
2003) (upholding a decision that a salmon aquaculture project within a refuge
in Alaska was compatible with refuge purposes), reh en banc ranted, opinion
vacated, 340 E3d 768 (9th Cir. 2003), amendedon rehken banc, 360 F.3d 1374
(9th Cir. 2004) (finding that aquaculture project violated the Wilderness Act
without resolving whether the project also violated the NWRSIA). In Fund for
Animals v. Ha4 the court found that the FWS violated NEPA (but not the
NWRSIA) by failing to consider the cumulative impacts of recreational hunt-
ing in sixty refuges, but on remand, the FWS cured this defect by considering
cumulative impacts in its revised refuge-level assessments. Fund for Animals v.
Hall, 777 E Supp. 2d 92, 92 (D.D.C. 2011).
326. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2006).
327. See 1 CoGGINS & GLIcKSMAN, supra note 303, at 5 6:17 (describing mandate
and discretion of the Forest Service). Another multiple-use statute, the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, requires that the BLM "by regulation or
otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion of the [public] lands." 42 U.S.C. 5 1732(b) (2006). The statute fails to
define these terms, and the regulatory history has taken several turns. See 43
C.ER. § 3809.0-5(k) (1981); 43 C.ER. § 3809.5 (2001); Mineral Pol'y Ctr. v.
Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2003). A watered-down interpreta-
tion of "undue degradation" was upheld in Theodore Roosevelt Conservation
P'ship v. Salazar, 661 E3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
328. See National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat.
2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
329. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (3) (C) (2006).
330. Id § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i), (iii).
331. Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 800 (5th Cit. 1994).
As a result, the courts have been loath to upset the multiple
use, sustained yield agenda. 332
NFMA also requires that forest plans "provide for diversity
of plant and animal communities." 33 3 This imprecise provi-
sion imposes weak constraints on Forest Service discretion.3
The courts have generally refused to require any precise
level of diversity35 and have tended to defer to the agency's
technical expertise in applying the diversity requirement,336
although less so in cases involving earlier versions of the
agency's implementing regulations that contained relatively
specific constraints on forest management.337
The general nature of NFMA's broad constraints, and the
judicial reluctance in many cases to rely on them to halt tim-
ber, grazing, and other projects detrimental to resource integ-
rity, make them poor models for strengthening the CWA's
antidegradation policy. Nevertheless, the focus in the diver-
sity regulations on ecosystem characteristics and biological
communities can provide useful guidance for defining deg-
radation and for identifying, restoring, and maintaining the
integrity of important aquatic ecosystems, especially those
with "exceptional ecological significance," through antideg-
radation requirements.3 38
332. Id.; Lamb v. Thompson, 265 F.3d 1038, 1048-50 (10th Cir 2001); Wilder-
ness Soc'y v. Thomas, 188 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999); Mountain States
Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 E3d 1228, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
333. 16 U.S.C. § 16 0 4(g)(3)(B) (2006).
334. 3 COGGINS & GumCKSMA, supra note 303, § 34:15.
335. For notable exceptions, see Seattle Audubon Socy v. Moseley, 798 E Supp.
1473 (WD. Wash. 1992), af'd, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (enjoining tim-
her sales on grounds that the diversity duty requires planning for the entire
biological community, such that a management plan that would preserve a
management indicator species such as the owl, only to exterminate other spe-
cies, would conflict with the duty); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 E
Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (similar).
336. See, e.g., Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 641 E3d 423, 440-43 (10th
Cir. 2011) (upholding the agency's approval of a timber sale even though pop-
ulation levels for a management indicator species were below the minimum
viable population threshold and were declining, and the project called for de-
struction of additional habitat); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 810 F. Supp. 1021,
1028 (WD. Ark. 1992), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 28 E3d
753 (8th Cir. 1994). See abo Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d at 800 (concluding
that the protection of diversity "means something less than preservation of the
status quo but something more than eradication of species").
337. From 1982 to 2005, the Forest Service's regulations implementing NFMAs
diversity provision required sufficient habitat to support viable populations
of wildlife and fish species-"a minimum number of reproductive individu-
als ... well distributed so that those individuals can interact with others in
the planning area." 36 C.ER. § 219.19 (1982). In 2005, the regulation was
replaced with much more general provisions on ecological, social, and eco-
nomic sustainability. 36 C.ER. §§ 219.10, 219.19-21 (2011). In 2012, the
agency amended its planning regulations again. The new version adopts "a
complementary ecosystem and species-specific approach to maintaining the
diversity of plant and animal communities and the persistence of native species
in the plan area." National Forest System Land and Resource Management
Planning Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 21162, 21212 (Apr. 9, 2012) (to be codi-
fied at 36 C.ER. pt. 219.9(a)). Among other things, the regulations require
each forest plan to include standards or guidelines "to maintain or restore the
diversity of ecosystems and habitat types throughout the plan area," including
components to maintain or restore "(i) Key characteristics associated with ter-
restrial and aquatic ecosystem types; (ii) Rare aquatic and terrestrial plant and
animal communities; and (iii) The diversity of native tree species similar to that
existing in the plan area." Id. at 21,265. It remains to be seen whether the 2012
regulations meaningfully constrain agency discretion.
338. Additional guidance might be drawn from the more stringent constraints on
approval of activities that would adversely affect National Forest wilderness
study areas in state-specific wilderness legislation. See, e.g., Montana Wilder-
ness Study Act 8 3(a), Pub. L. No. 95-150, 91 Stat. 1243 (1977); Russell
Country Sportsmen v. U.S. Forest Serv., 668 E3d 1037, 1042-44 (9th Cit.
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B. The Lessons of Federal Lands for Protecting Water
Resources Against Degradation
Among the federal land management statutes discussed in
the previous section, the Park Service Organic Act and the
NWRSIA seem to provide the most appropriate guidance
for strengthening the CWA's antidegradation requirements.
Although the WSRA can supply some lessons for the CWA,
its aspirations for maintaining free-flowing rivers are not as
specific as the non-impairment provisions of those other two
laws with respect to anything but dams. Additionally, its pro-
visions are not as closely related to protecting the biological,
chemical, or physical integrity of the system.3 As a result,
the WSRA remains an underutilized tool and, arguably, a
less optimal analogue. The Wilderness Act already protects
the components of high-quality waters that run through
federally designated wilderness areas by prohibiting, with
limited exceptions, activities that would detract from wil-
derness values, including commercial activities that might
otherwise threaten water quality.3 40 The Act provides a less
than ideal model for protecting high-quality waters outside
the boundaries of wilderness areas, however, because a ban
on all discharges from industrial and commercial activities
would impose unrealistic constraints that upset the balance
between environmental protection and economic growth
that Congress endorsed in 1987 by codifying EPA's existing
antidegradation policy. 4 ' As for the NFMA, its production-
oriented focus and delegation of sweeping agency discre-
tion are not particularly helpful to efforts to strengthen the
CWA's antidegradation policy.342
The Park Service Organic Act's goals and mandates could
be tailored to provide appropriately enhanced protection for
the nation's high-quality waters. The Act aims to conserve
and prevent impairment of park scenery, wildlife, and other
natural resources for the enjoyment of both present and
2011) (holding that this mandate gave the agency the authority not only to
maintain, but also to enhance the wild, natural characteristics by closing off
pre-existing routes to motor vehicles). Although the court reasoned that "[the
Act simply requires the Service to preserve a study area's wilderness character
against decline," it found that "[elnhancement of wilderness character is fully
consistent with the Study Act's mandate, although the Study Act does not re-
quire it." Id at 1042. The Idaho district court reached a similar conclusion un-
der the Wyoming Wilderness Act in Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Timchak, No.
CV-06-04-E-BLW, 2006 WL 3386731, at *3-6 (D. Idaho 2006), overturning
a decision to permit increased heli-skiing in a WSA because the Service failed
to show that available opportunities for solitude would be maintained despite
the increased use.
339. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2012), with 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) and 16 U.S.C.
§ 668dd(a)(2) (2006).
340. NAT'L WILD & SCENIC RIVERS SYSTEM, IMPLEMENTING THE WILD & 5CE-
ic RIVERs ACT: AUrHORITIES & ROLES OF KEY FEDERAL AGENCIES (1999),
available at http://www.rivers.gov/rivers/documents/federal-agency-roles.pdf
("River-administering agencies are directed to cooperate with the EPA and
appropriate state water pollution control agencies 'for the purpose of elimi-
nating or diminishing the pollution of waters of the river' (Section 12(c) of
the WSRA). The CWA, Floodplain and Wetlands Executive Orders, and the
SDWA provide EPAs authority to protect water quality.").
341. Ross W. GORTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41649, WILDERNESs LAws:
STATUTORY PROvIsIONs & PROHIBITED & PERMITTED USES (2011), available
at http://www.wilderness.net/NWPS/documents/Wilderness%2Laws-Statu-
tory/o20Provisions%20and%20Prohibited%20and%20Permirtd%2OUses.
pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 39.
342. See supra Part III.A.5.
future generations. 3  Park Service policies recognize that
the conservation of plants and animals entails not just pro-
tecting individual species but maintaining them "as parts of
the natural ecosystems of parks."4 '4 The Service also sees the
conservation of "evolving genetic diversity" as part of its mis-
sion." The CWAs antidegradation policy could be amended
to define "degradation" as impairment of water quality in
a covered water body that either results in impairment or
threatened impairment of an existing use-especially fish-
ing, swimming, or higher uses-or adversely affects the
ecological resilience of the water body, such that its capac-
ity to continue to provide important ecosystem services is
reduced. Such a dual standard would measure degradation
by two yardsticks-one that focuses on suitability for par-
ticular human uses and another that focuses on the role of
the affected water body in the ecosystem of which it is a part.
Yet the Organic Act is not perfect, and impairment of
resources within the National Park System has occurred.146
Like the rest of North America, the System has experienced
sharp declines in the diversity and abundance of animal and
plant species. 4 7 The culprits are found, for the most part,
outside of park boundaries on adjacent federal, state, and
private lands. 48 Such "external threats . . . could destabi-
lize park wildlife populations and critical ecosystem services,
such as clean water and flood control."349 In particular, a
2009 National Parks Science Committee Report observed
that there must be far greater protection for freshwater sys-
tems if parks are to remain a "haven ... for once-widespread
species and ecosystems."5 0 The "external threats" problem
is relevant to the antidegradation policy because a Tier 3
ONRW river that runs through a wilderness area or a park,
for example, may have segments that are not given Tier 3
protections, and those segments may be degraded in ways
that adversely affect the Tier 3 segment.3 1
343. 16 U.S.C. § 1.
344. MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006, supra note 267, § 4.4.1. See id. 5 1.4.7.2 ("The
Service will also strive to ensure that park resources and values are passed on to
future generations in a condition that is as good as, or better than, the condi-
tions that exist today.").
345. Id. § 4.4.1.2 ("Ihe Service will strive to protect the full range of genetic types
(genotypes) of native plant and animal populations in the parks by perpetuat-
ing natural evolutionary processes and minimizing human interference with
evolving genetic diversity."). Compare NWRSIA, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006)
(explicitly recognizing "restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources
and their habitats" as a mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System
"where appropriate").
346. Keiter, supra note 271, at 92.
347. See NAT'L PARKs Scs. Comm., D-1589A, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE SCIENCE IN
THE 21sT CENTURY 1 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter NAT'L PARKS ScI. COMM.]
(observing that "national parks with decreased biological diversity and dimin-
ished natural systems can in no way be considered unimpaired," and arguing
that establishing a "fully constituted science program" is essential to the non-
impairment mandate). See also Debra L. Donahue, Trampling the Public Trust,
37 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REv. 257, 264-65 (2010) (describing how the loss
of a top predator has had devastating ripple effects in Yellowstone, Yosemite,
Wind Cave, Zion, and Olympic National Parks and in Jasper National Park
in Canada).
348. Keiter, supra note 271, at 92.
349. Id.
350. NAT'L PARKS ci. Comm., supra note 347, at 3.
351. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 91 (1992) (approving discharge
by sewage treatment facility into a portion of the Illinois River in Arkansas that
is upstream from a segment within Oklahoma that had been designated as a
scenic river).
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Still, water quality within the boundaries of the National
Park System seems to be at least somewhat better than out-
side of the System. In 1993, the Park Service established a
nationwide goal that by 2008 more than ninety-nine percent
of streams and rivers managed by the Service would meet
state and federal water quality standards adopted under the
CWA.352 To achieve this goal, the Service, in partnership
with the U.S. Geological Survey, is preparing inventories of
water quality in Park units.353 Not surprisingly, water quality
within and among units varies significantly, making gener-
alizations difficult.354 For example, water bodies within Yel-
lowstone National Park "continue to be of high quality,"3 5
but in the more populous Mid-Atlantic Region, twenty-one
percent of the ONRWs were impaired and none had attained
all of their designated uses. 3 56 System-wide, the Park Service
has fallen short of its ninety-nine percent water quality com-
pliance goal, but it appears to be taking steps in the right
direction under the Organic Act and, where applicable, the
ONRW provisions of the antidegradation policy.5 7 Yet, the
existence of significant noncompliance even in ONRWs
highlights the need for the imposition of restoration respon-
sibilities on states whose high quality, or otherwise outstand-
ing, waters violate water quality standards or other aspects of
the antidegradation policy.358
The NWRSIA can serve as another appropriate guide-
post for improving the CWA's antidegradation program.
In one sense, at least, it may be even more useful than the
Park Service Organic Act. Economic uses of wildlife refuges
may be allowed, but decisionmakers are required to make an
explicit finding that such uses will help achieve either ref-
uge purposes or the overall mission of the Wildlife Refuge
System, and also to prevent such uses from impairing refuge
resources.3 59 Moreover, the statute unequivocally directs the
FWS "to sustain and, where appropriate, restore and enhance,
healthy populations of fish, wildlife, and plants."360 Like the
Organic Act, the NWRSIA promotes the biological diver-
sity and integrity of the system. The NWRSIA, however,
includes more substantive management criteria with rela-
tively rich detail, and the Refuge Management Policy adds
even more detail.36 As Professor Robert L. Fischman has
observed, the Refuge Management Policy elevates promo-
352. Frank A. Deviney Jr. et al., Water Quality Monitoring in the Mid-Atlantic Net-
work of the National Park Service, App. 4, p. 15 (2005) (citing Goal la4A),
available at http://science.nature.nps.gov/im/units/midn/Phase 1Report/
Appendix_4._WQScopingReport.pdf
353. Freshwater Resources Management, NAT'L PARK SERv., http://wwwnature.nps.
gov/rm77/freshwater/waterresources.cfm (last updated Feb. 5, 2004).
354 . Id
355. NAT'L PARK SERv., NPS/GRYN/NRDS-2011/310, GREATER YELLOWSTONE
NETwoRx WATER QUALITY MONITORING ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 2009-
DECEMBER 2009 ix (2011), availabe at http://www.greateryellowstonescience.
org/subproducts/214/7.
356. Deviney et al., supra note 352, at 2.
357. Water Quaity Program, NAT'L PARK SEsv., http://www.nature.nps.gov/water/
waterquality/ (last updated Feb. 2, 2012); see also Baseline Water Qualty Data
Inventory & Analysis Reports, NAr'L PARK SERv., http://www.nature.nps.gov/
water/horizon.cfm (last updated Jul. 2, 2012).
358. Deviney et al., supra note 352, at 17.
359. Fischman, supra note 306, at 111; see supra notes 310-11.
360. 16 U.S.C.A. § 668ee(4 ) (2006) (emphasis added).
361. Fischman, sups note 306, at 111.
tion of the Wildlife Refuge System's conservation mission,
supported by the integrity-diversity-health mandate, above
the promotion of wildlife-dependent recreation.3 62 This level
of detail cabins the agency's discretion, and empowers citi-
zens and courts to ensure implementation of the Act's con-
servationlintegrity requirement.
Drawing on the NWRSIA example, the CWA's antideg-
radation policy could declare that discharges from new or
expanded economic uses that would adversely impact Tier 2
waters cannot be permitted absent a specific finding that the
new or expanded use meets certain clearly delineated cri-
teria demonstrating its necessity to the community or the
state. In addition, the antidegradation policy could declare
the issuance of permits involving discharges of specified pol-
lutants (or amounts of pollutants) to be incompatible (or
presumptively incompatible) with the maintenance of the
high-quality waters protected by the policy.6 The policy
could distinguish among the tiers of water bodies by limit-
ing this approach to new or expanded discharges into Tier
1 waters, but extending it to all discharges, including exist-
ing discharges, for Tier 3 (and perhaps Tier 2) waters. This
approach resembles the prohibition in FWS regulations on
approval of certain uses of the wildlife refuges absent a show-
ing of compatibility.M
IV. Recommendations for Strengthening
the Antidegradation Program
Building on forty years of experience with the CWA's anti-
degradation policy, and on the comparative strengths and
weaknesses of the CAA and federal land management stat-
utes, we offer four recommendations to improve the antideg-
radation policy. Each of the recommendations responds to
one of the deficiencies in the antidegradation program iden-
tified in Part II.C above.
First, we recommend a federal regulation requiring states
to designate waters within national parks and wildlife ref-
uges and other waters of "exceptional ecological significance"
as ONRWs in their WQS inventories.' The current regula-
tions fail to provide any direction regarding the designation
processes, beyond referencing parks and refuges; as a result,
there is inadequate protection for some of the nation's most
362. Id. at 112, citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERv., REFUGE MANUAL, 605
§§ 1.13(B), 1.8(B), (D)(3) (2000). See also U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., REF-
UGE MANAGEMENT 605 §5 1.9-1.10, available athttp://policy.fws.gov/ser600.
html.
363. Under the presumptive incompatibility approach, the burden would shift to
permit applicants to demonstrate that discharge of the pollutants or amounts
involved would not result in impermissible degradation, and therefore would
be compatible with the policy.
364. See supra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
365. See Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 36742, 36786 (July
7, 1998). EPA defines "waters of exceptional ecological significance" as those
"water bodies which are important, unique, or sensitive ecologically but whose
water quality, as measured by the traditional characteristics (dissolved oxygen,
pH, etc.) may not be particularly high, such as thermal springs. Waters of
exceptional ecological significance also include waters whose characteristics
cannot adequately be described by these parameters." Id; see also Water Qual-
ity Standards Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. at 51403; Brawer, supra note 127, at
20-21 (recomnending more well-defined processes for citizen petition and
designation of ONRWs).
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important aquatic resources."' In 1998, EPA suggested in
an advance notice of proposed rulemaking that states and
tribes should be required to establish a nomination pro-
cess with criteria guidelines so that interested citizens or
groups could petition for designation of certain waters as
ONRWs. 67 The New Mexico experience demonstrates how
public involvement can promote the process of protect-
ing high-quality waters if citizens have a viable procedural
mechanism and if sufficient criteria are delineated to guide
agency responses and allow meaningful judicial review. 68
These criteria would elaborate on the meaning of "excep-
tional ecological significance," perhaps using factors similar
to those by which the 2012 Forest Service planning regula-
tions measure ecosystem integrity.69
In addition, states should be required to take concrete
steps, including the reduction of aggregate discharges, to
restore the quality of Tier 3 and other degraded, but oth-
erwise high-quality, waters covered by the antidegradation
policy. EPA would be obliged to determine during each
triennial review of state water quality standards whether
states have complied with this responsibility. EPAs failure to
require restoration when the policy demands it would then
be judicially reviewable.70 The imposition of a restoration
mandate would be consistent with the CWAs overarching
goal of "restor[ing]" as well as maintaining the integrity of
the waters of the United States.37'
Second, EPA should promulgate a regulatory definition of
"degradation." Formalizing EPA's informal guidance direct-
ing the regions to consider "assimilative capacity" would be
a step in the right direction. This step, however, would not
go far enough because it may result in new or increased dis-
charges on large lakes and rivers whose assimilative capacity
appears to be great, but may not in fact be as great as pre-
sumed, or whose aquatic environment may not respond in
a predictable fashion to pollutants. In addition, a mandate
to consider assimilative capacity in isolation may still allow
multiple discharges over time to severely affect the integrity
of a water body without ever undergoing a comprehensive
antidegradation review.372 Looking to the NWRSIA 73 and
the Organic Act 74 for guideposts, the new definition should
366. Adler, supra note 109, at 287.
367. Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. at 36786.
368. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 337 and accompanying text (regarding National Forest Sys-
tem Land Management Planning, 36 C.F.R. § 219.8(a)(1) (2011) (listing as
factors relevant to the protection of ecosystem integrity (i) interdependence
of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, (ii) an areas contributions to ecological
conditions within the broader landscape influenced by the area, (iii) conditions
in the broader landscape that may influence the sustainability of resources and
ecosystems within the affected area, (iv) system drivers such as dominant eco-
logical processes, disturbance regimes, and stressors, such as natural succession,
wildland fire, invasive species, and climate change; (v) the ability of terrestrial
and aquatic ecosystems to adapt to change, and (vi) opportunities for land
scape scale restoration).
370. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(1) (2006) (authorizing review of final agency ac-
tion and of an agency's failure to act to fulfill discrete statutory or regulatory
mandates).
371. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
372. Ohio Valley Envl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732, 752 (S.D. W. Va.
2003).
373. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a) (2006).
374. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
include substantive criteria and thresholds or triggers to guide
the permitting process to better meet the goals of the anti-
degradation policy and the CWA as a whole and to enable
meaningful citizen involvement and judicial review. As sug-
gested above, drawing on the analogy to the Park Service
experience, "degradation" could be defined as impairment
of water quality that either results in loss or threatened loss
of an existing or potentially viable use-especially fishing,
swimming, and higher uses-or adversely affects the ecolog-
ical resilience of the water body such that its capacity to con-
tinue to provide important ecosystem services is reduced.3 75
In addition, based on the NWRSIA example, the issuance
of permits involving discharges of specified pollutants (or
amounts of pollutants) could be declared incompatible (or
presumptively incompatible) with maintenance of the high-
quality waters protected by the antidegradation policy. 76
Third, states should be required to extend their antideg-
radation programs to nonpoint source runoff.3 77 One of the
biggest holes in the antidegradation policy is the failure to
regulate nonpoint sources that degrade water quality.3 78
States have the discretion to extend their antidegradation
requirements to nonpoint sources, but it appears that, at
present, states cannot be forced to do so." Even when state
antidegradation requirements nominally apply to nonpoint
sources, those requirements sometimes effectively have no
substantive content. 8t As noted above, a few courts have
upheld EPA's approval of a state's water quality standards
that exempted nonpoint source discharges from antidegra-
dation requirements.38 ' However, EPA once took the posi-
tion that "[n]onpoint source activities are not exempt from
the provisions of the antidegradation policy."38 2 A persuasive
argument can be made that EPA should reinvigorate this
position, and indeed that it has an affirmative duty to ensure
that state programs for nonpoint source pollution-includ-
ing antidegradation programs-do not defeat the CWA's
objectives. t Some judicial interpretations of the CWA
support state efforts to control nonpoint source pollution
through antidegradation requirements.8 The water quality
standard-setting process applies to waters polluted by both
375. See supra Part III.B; see also Hines, supra note 8 (quoting FED. WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR EsTAB-
USHING WATER QUAuTY STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE WATERS 5, 7 (1966))
("[fin no case will standards providing for less than existing water quality be
acceptable"; standards shall provide for "[tihe maintenance and protection of
quakty and use or uses of water now of a higher quality or ofa quakrty suitablefjr
present and potential uses") (emphasis added).
376. See supra notes 363-64 and accompanying text.
377. Modesitt, supra note 207, at 220-21.
378. Id.
379. Id at 195, 221 (assessing application of state antidegradation prograns to
nonpoint source pollution).
380. See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir.
1998) (concluding that "the Arkansas statewide policy for nonpoint sources is
so broadly stated that the Forest Service was not arbitrary or capricious in con-
cluding this policy added nothing to its compliance obligations under federal
environmental laws").
381. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
382. QuESTIoNs & ANSwERs, supra note 26, at 6 (emphasis added); see U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 39, at 5 4.8.
383. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
384. See supra Part II.B.1.
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point source and nonpoint source pollution."' Further, EPA
regulations already require the states to "achieve[] . . . cost-
effective and reasonable best management practices for non-
point source control.
Fourth, to address EPAs failure to provide consistent fol-
low through on requiring states to properly implement the
antidegradation policy, mandatory state planning and assess-
ment responsibilities could be added. For example, states
might be required to consider as part of the triennial water
quality standard revision process whether the designation of
additional Tier 1, 2, or 3 waters is appropriate and document
the results of that assessment. In addition, the states should
be required to explain any refusal to designate ONRWs. EPA
would have to consider the state's explanation in deciding
whether to approve or disapprove state water quality stan-
dards as consistent with CWA requirements. 3 7 EPA deter-
minations would then be judicially reviewable. The CWA
already requires states to engage in a continuing planning
process that includes "adequate implementation ... for
revised or new water quality standards," which of course
include the antidegradation policy." State planning respon-
sibilities are far less rigorous under the CWA than they are
under the CAA, but efforts by EPA during the Clinton
Administration to mandate planning obligations to achieve
water quality standards similar to state implementation
plan duties under the CAA ran into political opposition.3 9
385. See CWA § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006) (drawing no distinction between
pollution from point sources and nonpoint sources); Nw. Envl. Advocates v.
Cityof Portland, 56 F.3d 979,986 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[Niowhere does Congress
evidence an intent to preclude the enforcement of water quality standards that
have not been translated into effluent discharge limitations.").
386. 40 C.ER. § 131.12(a)(2) (2011); see David Zaring, Best Pactices, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 294, 326-27 (2006) (stating that "best practices regulation is currently
the only form of federal regulation of runoff or 'nonpoint source' pollution").
387. CWA§ 303(c)(4 ), 33 U.S.C. 8 1313(c)(4).
388. Id. § 1313(e)(3)(F).
389. See Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Partd TMDLs and
the Chesapeake Bay, 41 ELR 10208, 10213 (Mar. 2011).
Enhancement of selected aspects of state water quality stan-
dard implementation, such as those relating to compliance
with the antidegradation policy, is worth another look.
V. Conclusion
The four reforms suggested in Part IV would promote the
primary goals of the antidegradation policy, especially pro-
viding a margin of safety, protecting high-value natural
resources, preventing the development of pollution havens,
and balancing environmental goals and economic growth
opportunities. 90 These reforms would also do much to
move the nation's water bodies beyond the "least common
denominator" of fishable/swimmable waters and toward the
CWAs overarching goal of maintaining, as well as restoring,
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of aquatic
environments. Efforts to prevent degradation of high-qual-
ity water bodies are analogous to efforts to prevent impair-
ment of clean airsheds and ecologically important natural
resources found on the federal lands. The public land man-
agement statutes, in particular, provide a host of widely
divergent models for use and protection of natural resources.
Statutory provisions that prevent impairment of the national
parks and wildlife refuges could serve as models for strength-
ening the CWAs antidegradation program.
390. See supra Part I.C.
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